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Using a German firm-level data set, this paper is the first to jointly study the cyclical 
properties of the cross-sections of firm-level real value added and Solow residual innovations, 
as well as capital and employment adjustment. We find two new business cycle facts: 1) The 
cross-sectional standard deviation of firm-level innovations in the Solow residual, value 
added and employment is robustly and significantly countercyclical. 2) The cross-sectional 
standard deviation of firm-level investment is procyclical. We show that a heterogeneous-firm 
RBC model with quantitatively realistic countercyclically disperse innovations in the firm-
level Solow residual and non-convex adjustment costs calibrated to the non-Gaussian features 
of the steady state investment rate distribution, produces investment dispersion that positively 
comoves with the cycle, with a correlation coefficient of 0.58, compared to 0.45 in the data. 
We argue more generally that the cross-sectional business cycle dynamics impose tight 
empirical restrictions on structural parameters and stochastic properties of driving forces in 
heterogeneous-firm models, and are therefore paramount in the calibration of these models. 
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The cross-section of ﬁrms – more speciﬁcally the dispersions of change rates of ﬁrm-level out-
put, capital, employment and Solow residuals – display stark cyclical patterns. This paper sys-
tematically documents the cyclical properties of these moments of the cross-section of ﬁrms.
Using the balance sheet data set of Deutsche Bundesbank (USTAN) – a private sector, annual,
ﬁrm-level data set that allows us to investigate 26 years of data (1973-1998), in which the cross-
sections of the panel have over 30,000 ﬁrms per year on average –, we show that the cross-
sectional standard deviations of the ﬁrm-level innovations in the Solow residual, value added
and employment are robustly and signiﬁcantly countercyclical, as measured by the contempo-
raneous correlation with the cyclical component of aggregate output. In contrast, the cross-
sectional standard deviation of ﬁrm-level investment rates is robustly and signiﬁcantly pro-
cyclical. These results hold when different ﬁltering methods are used, as well as the cross-
sectional interquartile range as a measure of dispersion. They are also robust to using cyclical
indicators other than aggregate output and to various changes in the sample selection criteria.
Figure 1 illustrates these two new business cycle facts (see Appendix A.5 for a time series graph
of the investment rate dispersion):
Figure 1: Cross-sectional Dispersion of Firm-Level Investment Rates and Solow Residual Inno-
vations
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2It is clear that this ﬁnding is incompatible with a simple frictionless model of the ﬁrm with
ex ante homogeneous ﬁrms, as the latter would imply that the stochastic properties of the driv-
ing force – in this case dispersion in the innovations to ﬁrm-level Solow residuals – are at least
qualitatively inherited by the outcome variables. Indeed, we show that such a model would
lead to a counterfactual correlation of -0.54 between investment dispersion and aggregate out-
put, compared to 0.45 in the data. We propose a heterogenous-ﬁrm RBC model with persistent
idiosyncratic productivity shocks and lumpy capital adjustment to explain both qualitatively
and quantitatively the procyclicality of investment dispersion, even in the presence of coun-
tercyclical second-moment shocks in the driving force. The basic intuition, why lumpy capital
adjustment is at least qualitatively a suitable candidate to explain this fact, can be glanced from
the simple Ss-model in Caplin and Spulber (1987):
Proposition:
In a one-sided Ss-model a la Caplin and Spulber in steady state with a uniform gap- distri-
bution, ﬁxed optimal adjustment policy S ¡s and shock ¢z È 0, the variance of adjustments is
increasing in ¢z if and only if the fraction of adjusters is smaller than 0.5.
Proof:
As is well known, average adjustment in this environment is ¢z. From this, it follows that













which is increasing in ¢z if and only if ¢z
S¡s Ç0.5, where ¢z
S¡s is the fraction of adjusters.
This example shows that with sufﬁcient inertia the comovement of the extensive margin
with the cycle leads to a procyclical dispersion of adjustment, as in this simple model all the
dynamics are driven by the extensive margin. The intensive margin of adjustment, S¡s, is ﬁxed
by assumption. We will show that in a more realistic model a positive extensive margin effect is
still operative and can explain the observed procyclicality of investment dispersion.
Figure 2 displays sectoral variation that provides further suggestive evidence for this mech-
anism. Itplotstwocorrelationcoefﬁcientsforthesixone-digitsectorsweobserveintheUSTAN
database against each other. On the x-axis it displays the correlation coefﬁcients of investment
rate dispersion with the cyclical component of its own sectoral output. On the y-axis it displays
the correlation coefﬁcients of the fraction of adjusters with these same output measures.1 The
plot shows that there is a positive association between the procyclicality of investment disper-
sion and the procyclicality of the extensive margin. Incidentally, the contemporaneous cor-
relation between the extensive margin and output for the aggregate USTAN data set is 0.73, a
number even higher than for investment rate dispersion.
1UsingtheconventionofCooperandHaltiwanger(2006), wedeﬁneinvestingﬁrmsasthosewithannualinvest-
ment rates of absolute value larger than 1%.
3Figure 2: Sectoral Variation in the Procyclicality of the Extensive Margin and Investment Rate
Dispersion
Notes: AGR: Agriculture; MIN: Mining & Energy; MAN: Manufacturing; CON: Construction; TRD: Trade (Retail &
Wholesale); TRA: Transportation & Communication. HP(100)¡Y refers to the cyclical component of the output
of the corresponding sector. Both investment dispersion and the fraction of adjusters are linearly detrended.
We ﬁnd more suggestive evidence that it is most likely lumpy capital adjustment that is gen-
eratingthisresult: 1)weshowthatinasectorlikemanufacturing(seeagainFigure2, leftpanel),
wherewewouldexpectnon-convexfactoradjustmenttobemostprevalent,procyclicalityofin-
vestment dispersion is particularly pronounced, even though the driving force is most starkly
countercyclically disperse in this sector; 2) we also show that for smaller ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms that
arelikelyincapableofoutgrowingadjustmentcosts,investmentdispersionissigniﬁcantlymore
procyclical than for the largest ﬁrms. In contrast, conditional on ﬁrm size, ﬁnance variables
do not seem to have a large impact on the cyclicality of investment dispersion. We conclude
from this that the explanation does not lie in a ﬁnancial friction. We also ﬁnd no evidence of
a composition effect in the sense that some large sectors or large ﬁrms have actually procycli-
cal second-moment shocks that make the overall investment dispersion likewise procyclical. 3)
Finally, we ﬁnd that the dispersion of investment rates is countercyclical – -0.549 – just like the
drivingforce,onceweconditiononlargeandlumpyinvestmentsasdeﬁnedbya20%-threshold
(seeCooperandHaltiwanger, 2006), inordertomeasurethedispersionoftheintensivemargin.
This is further evidence that the procyclicality of the unconditional investment rate dispersion
is driven by movements in the extensive margin.
4Why is this important? First, in our view explaining the business cycle dynamics of the
higher cross-sectional moments of the underlying macroeconomic aggregates is just as impor-
tant for our understanding of the business cycle as explaining these aggregates themselves. A
fully ﬂedged business cycle theory has to speak to these cross-sectional dynamics as well. This
paper systematically documents the relevant facts and explains the most striking of them: pro-
cyclical investment dispersion in the presence of countercyclical second-moment shocks (see
Figure 1 and Table 3 in Section 2.2). Secondly, heterogenous-ﬁrm models have seen increased
use both in the macroeconomic as well as international ﬁnance literature. We show in this pa-
per that cross-sectional dynamics impose tight restrictions on structural parameters as well as
on the nature and stochastic properties of the driving forces in these models.2 For instance, we
showthatprocyclicalinvestmentdispersion–generatedbyaprocyclicalextensivemargineffect
as in the above proposition – requires a large capital-curvature of the revenue function of the
ﬁrm, for this procyclical extensive margin effect to be strong enough in the presence of coun-
tercyclical second-moment shocks. Only with a large capital-curvature rely ﬁrms mostly on the
extensive margin for their capital adjustment (see Gourio and Kashyap (2007) for a related ob-
servation). We also document that the volatility of the countercyclical second-moment shocks
must not be too strong to be compatible with procyclical investment dispersion. In particular,
countercyclical second-moment shocks as large as suggested by Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al.
(2009) and large enough to generate interesting business cycle dynamics are incompatible with
this cross-sectional business cycle fact. That means cross-sectional dynamics have also strong
implications for the nature of aggregate dynamics.
Related Literature
The empirical part of this paper, section 2, is most closely related to a series of papers by
Higson and Holly et al. (2002, 2004), Doepke and Holly et al. (2005, 2008), Doepke and Weber
(2006), as well as Holly and Santoro (2008). Higson and Holly et al. (2002), using
Compustat data, study empirically the cyclicality of the standard deviation, skewness and kur-
tosis of the sales growth rate distribution and ﬁnd them to be countercyclical, countercyclical
and procyclical, respectively. Higson and Holly et al. (2004) repeat this analysis for UK data on
quoted ﬁrms, and Doepke and Holly et al. (2005) for Germany, using the USTAN database, with
similar ﬁndings. Doepke and Weber (2006) study, again using USTAN data, the cyclicality of
transitions between sales growth regimes in ﬁrm-level data. In contrast to these papers, we fo-
cus on the cyclicality of cross-sectional second moments only, but include value added, Solow
residuals, investment rates and employment change rates into the analysis.3 The quantitative-
2Khan and Thomas (2005), in an earlier version of their 2008-paper, make a similar observation on the impor-
tance of general equilibrium in understanding cross-sectional ﬁrm dynamics. We conﬁrm their conjecture here.
3Holly and Santoro (2008) as well as Doepke and Holly et al. (2008) start from the aforementioned empirical
5theoretical part of this paper – sections 3, 4 and 5 – draws heavily on the recent literature
on heterogenous-ﬁrm RBC models, developed in Khan and Thomas (2008), Bachmann et al.
(2008), Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2009) as well as Bachmann and Bayer (2009). Finally, our
work is related to the work by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005), who show that capital reallocation
is procyclical and explain this in a two-sector model with costly capital reallocation.
2 The Facts
In Section 2.1 we brieﬂy describe the USTAN data set and the main sample selection criteria
we use. Details are relegated to Appendix A.1. In Section 2.2 we present the baseline facts: the
contemporaneous correlations of cyclical aggregate output and the cross-sectional standard
deviations of ﬁrm-level Solow residual and real value added innovations as well as employment
change rates are negative, while the contemporaneous correlation of cyclical aggregate output
and the cross-sectional standard deviation of ﬁrm-level investment rates is positive. In Sec-
tion 2.4 we perform extensive robustness checks and also show, how these facts depend on
observable ﬁrm characteristics.
2.1 A Brief Data Description
2.1.1 USTAN Data
USTAN is a large annual ﬁrm-level balance sheet data base (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik) col-
lected by Deutsche Bundesbank. It is unique in its combination of size and coverage as well as
detail of available variables. It provides annual ﬁrm level data from 1971 to 1998 from the bal-
ance sheets and the proﬁt and loss accounts of over 60,000 ﬁrms per year (see Stoess (2001),
von Kalckreuth (2003) and Doepke et al. (2005) for further details). In the days when the dis-
countingofcommercialbillswereoneoftheprincipalinstrumentsofGermanmonetarypolicy,
Bundesbank law required the Bundesbank to assess the creditworthiness of all parties backing
a commercial bill put up for discounting. The Bundesbank implemented this regulation by re-
quiring balance sheet data of all parties involved. These balance sheet data were then archived
and collected into a database.
Although the sampling design – one’s commercial bill being put up for discounting – does
not lead to a representative selection of ﬁrms in a statistical sense, the coverage of the sample
is very broad. USTAN covers incorporated ﬁrms as well as privately-owned companies, which
work and explore them in a monopolistically competitive model with ﬁnancial frictions – the former – and in a
monopolistically competitive model with simple Calvo-type price-stickiness – the latter.
6distinguishes it positively from Compustat data.4 Its sectoral coverage – while still somewhat
biased to manufacturing ﬁrms – includes the construction, the service as well as the primary
sectors. This makes it different from, for instance, the Annual Survey of Manufacturing (ASM)
in the U.S.5 The following table 1 displays the sectoral coverage of our ﬁnal baseline sample.
Table 1: SECTORAL COVERAGE
1-digit Sector Firm-year observations Percentage
Agriculture - AGR 12,291 1.44
Mining & Energy - MIN 4,165 0.49
Manufacturing - MAN 405,787 47.50
Construction - CON 54,569 6.39
Trade (Retail & Wholesale) - TRD 355,208 41.59
Transportation & Communication - TRA 22,085 2.59
Moreover, while there remains a bias to somewhat larger and ﬁnancially healthier ﬁrms, the
size coverage is still fairly broad: 31% of all ﬁrms in our ﬁnal baseline sample have less than
20 employees and 57% have less than 50 employees (see Table 21 in Appendix A.1 for details).
Finally, the Bundesbank itself frequently used the USTAN data for its macroeconomic analyses
and for cross-checking national accounting data. We take this as an indication that the bank
considers the data as sufﬁciently representative and of sufﬁciently high quality. This makes the
USTANdataanexceptionallysuitabledatasourceforthestudyofcross-sectionalbusinesscycle
dynamics.
2.1.2 Selection of the Baseline Sample
FromtheoriginalUSTANdata,weselectonlyﬁrmsthatreportcompleteinformationonpayroll,
gross value added and capital stocks. Moreover, we drop observations from East German ﬁrms
to avoid a break of the series in 1990. In addition, we remove observations that stem from
irregular accounting statements, e.g. when ﬁling for bankruptcy or when closing operations.
We deﬂate all but the capital and investment data by the implicit deﬂator for gross value added
from the German national accounts.
Capital is deﬂated with one-digit sector- and capital-good speciﬁc investment good price
deﬂators within a perpetual inventory method. Even though USTAN data can be considered as
particularly high quality data, we cannot directly use capital stocks as reported. Tax motivated
4Davis et al. (2006) show that studying only publicly traded ﬁrms can lead to wrong conclusions, in particular
when higher cross-sectional moments are concerned. See Appendix A.1 Table 23 for ownership coverage in our
ﬁnal sample.
5Anadditionaladvantageofthesedataiseasyaccess: whileaccessison-site, itispracticallyfreeforresearchers,
so that results derived from this data base can be easily tested and checked.
7depreciation and price developments of capital goods lead to a general understatement of the
stock of capital a ﬁrm holds. Thus, capital stocks have to be recalculated using a perpetual
inventory method (see Appendix A.2, for details). Similarly, we recover the amount of labor
inputsfromwagebills,asinformationonthenumberofemployees(asopposedtopayrolldata)
is only updated infrequently for some companies (see Appendix A.3, for details). Finally, the
ﬁrm-level Solow residual is calculated from data on gross value added and factor inputs.
We remove outliers according to the following procedure: we calculate log changes in real
gross value added, the Solow residual, real capital and employment, as well as the ﬁrm-level in-
vestmentrateanddropallobservationswhereachangefallsoutsideathreestandarddeviations
interval around the year-speciﬁc mean.6 We also drop those ﬁrms for which we do not have at
least ﬁve observations in ﬁrst differences. This leaves us with a sample of 854,105 ﬁrm-year
observations, which corresponds to observations on 72,853 ﬁrms, i.e. the average observation
length of a ﬁrm in the sample is 11.7 years. The average number of ﬁrms in the cross-section
per year is 32,850. We perform numerous robustness checks with respect to each of the selec-
tion criteria and measurement choices: we use sectoral deﬂators for value added, an aggregate
investment good price deﬂator, change the cut-off rule to 2.5, 5 and 10 standard deviations and
leave all ﬁrms in the sample with two and twenty observations in ﬁrst differences, respectively.
None of these choices change our baseline results.7
2.1.3 Calculating the Solow Residual and Factor Adjustments
We compute the ﬁrm-level Solow residual based on the following Cobb-Douglas production




where ²i,t is ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, and zt is aggregate productivity. We assume that
labor input ni,t is immediately productive, whereas capital ki,t is pre-determined and inherited
fromlastperiod. Inourmainspeciﬁcation,weestimatetheoutputelasticitiesoftheproduction
factors, º and µ, as median shares of factor expenditures over gross value added within each
industry.8
For factor adjustment, we use the symmetric adjustment rate deﬁnition proposed in Davis
et al. (1996). We thus deﬁne ﬁrm-level investment rates as
ii,t
0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)
9 and ﬁrm-level em-
6This outlier removal is done after removing ﬁrm and sectoral ﬁxed effects. Centering the outlier removal
around the year mean is important to avoid artiﬁcial and countercyclical skewness of the respective distributions.
7See Appendix B for details. There we also discuss brieﬂy the issue of sample selection.
8To check the robustness of our results, we try alternative speciﬁcations with predeﬁned elasticities common
across sectors. We also change the timing assumption to include a predetermined employment stock, as well as
immediateadjustmentinbothfactors. Allresultsareveryrobusttothevariouswaysofgeneratingtheﬁrm-speciﬁc
Solow residual (for a detailed discussion, see Bachmann and Bayer, 2009).
9Appendix A.1 compares the USTAN aggregate and manufacturing investment rate histogram with the U.S. one
8ployment adjustment rates as
¢ni,t
0.5¤(ni,t¡1Åni,t).10 We use log-differences in the Solow residual to
capture Solow residual innovations, as the persistence of ﬁrm-level Solow residuals exhibits
behavior close to a unit root. We remove ﬁrm ﬁxed and sectoral-year11 effects from these ﬁrst-
difference variables to focus on idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations that do not capture differences in
sectoral responses to aggregate shocks or permanent ex-ante heterogeneity between ﬁrms.
2.1.4 Macro data
When combining this micro data with aggregate data, we have to take a stance on what sectoral
aggregate we view as the empirical counterpart to our model. We chose to include ﬁrms from
the following six sectors in our analysis: agriculture, mining and energy, manufacturing, con-
struction, trade (both retail and wholesale) as well as the transportation and communication
sector. Thisaggregatecanberoughlycharacterizedasthenon-ﬁnancialprivatebusinesssector
in Germany. Whenever we use the term aggregate in the following, we mean this sector.
German national accounting data per one-digit sector (see Appendix A.1 for a detailed de-
scription of the data sources used) allow us to compute real value added, investment, capital
and employment data for this sectoral aggregate, and therefore also an aggregate Solow resid-
ual. Our USTAN sample captures on average 70% of sectoral value added, 44% of sectoral in-
vestment, 71% of its capital stock and 49% of sectoral employment.12
In addition to representing a large part of the non-ﬁnancial private business sector in Ger-
many, USTAN also represents its cyclical behavior very well, as the following Table 2 shows:13
Table 2: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL AVERAGES











HP(¸)¡Y : Cyclical component of GDP after HP-ﬁltering using smoothing parameter ¸.
mean: cross-sectional average, linearly detrended.
fromtheLongitudinalResearchDatabase,LRD.Thesimilaritiesareremarkable,whichsuggeststhegeneralizability
of our results also to the U.S.
10The baseline within-transformed cross-sectional dispersion data for factor adjustments can be found in Ta-
ble 27 in Appendix A.6.
11The sectoral ﬁxed effects are essentially computed at the 2-digit level, see Table 20 in Appendix A.1 for details.
12The sectoral aggregate, in turn, captures 59% of real aggregate value added, 39% of aggregate investment, 26%
of aggregate capital and 65% of aggregate employment.
13We further document the good representation properties of USTAN in Appendix A.1.
92.2 Main Facts
The following Table 3 presents the main new stylized facts about the cross-sectional dynamics
ofﬁrms. Firm-levelinvestmentratesdisplayprocyclical dispersion,whereasthecross-sectional
standard deviations of the (log)-changes in Solow residuals, output and employment are coun-
tercyclical.
Table 3: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION
Cross-sectional Moment ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) 5% 95% Frac. w. opposite sign
¾(
ii,t
0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)) 0.451 0.070 0.737 0.029
¾(¢log²i,t) -0.481 -0.678 -0.306 0.000
¾(¢logyi,t) -0.450 -0.675 -0.196 0.005
¾(
¢ni,t
0.5¤(ni,t¡1Åni,t)) -0.498 -0.717 -0.259 0.001
Notes:
¾: cross-sectional standard deviation, linearly detrended.
The columns 5% and 95% refer to the top and bottom 5-percentiles in a parametric bootstrap of the correlation
coefﬁcient. The last column displays the fraction of simulations with the opposite sign of the point estimate. See
further notes to Table 2.
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 shows the contemporaneous correlation of the cyclical com-
ponent of aggregate output14 with the cross-sectional standard deviations of the ﬁrm-level in-
vestment rates, the percentage changes in the ﬁrm-level Solow residual and real value added
as well as employment changes. The ﬁrst is clearly procyclical, the latter three countercyclical.
The next two columns show the 5% and 95% conﬁdence bands from 10,000 parametric boot-
strap simulations.15 The last column displays the fraction of negative correlations for the stan-
dard deviation of the ﬁrm-level investment rates, and the fraction of positive correlations for
the remaining three standard deviations in these bootstrap simulations. These three columns
together show that the sign of all correlations is signiﬁcant. In the following, we show that ﬁnd-
ing a procyclical investment rate dispersion is robust to the speciﬁc choices we have made in
calculating the numbers in Table 3.
2.3 Robustness
Table 4 shows that procyclical investment dispersion is robust to the choice of the cyclical indi-
cator.16 Theresultstandsirrespectiveofwhetherwechooseascyclicalindicatorsoutputﬁltered
14For the baseline scenario we use log-output with an HP-parameter 100.
15We use a pairwise unrestricted VAR with one lag as the parametric model. The results from a nonparametric
overlapping block bootstrap with a block size of four are similar to the parametric bootstrap.
16This is also true for the three other variables, and for ¾(¢log²i,t) and ¾(¢logyi,t), we have documented this
and other robustness tests elsewhere: Bachmann and Bayer (2009).













Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. I refers to aggregate investment, N to aggregate employment.
using a smaller smoothing parameter for the HP ﬁlter, following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), apply a
log-difference ﬁlter to output, or use the linearly detrended average cross-sectional investment
rate, or the HP(100)-ﬁltered aggregate investment, employment or aggregate Solow residuals.
Table 5: PROCYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT DISPERSION - MORE ROBUSTNESS























Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. IQR stands for interquartile range, which is linearly detrended.
Vice versa, our ﬁnding is also robust to the choices we have made for the other part of the
correlation, see Table 5. One can use the interquartile range (IQR) as the dispersion measure,
and one can study the ﬁrm level net percentage change in capital as opposed to the investment
rate.17 Moreover, it is not the removal of ﬁrm-level and sectoral ﬁxed effects that induces this
procyclicality, as row three of this table shows. The next three rows show that the choice of
17This variable has the advantage that it corresponds to the percentage innovations in the stock of capital. We
canuseapermanent-transitorydecompositiontoseparatemeasurementerrorfromtrueinnovationstothecapital
stock. The resulting correlation coefﬁcient of the standard deviation of these puriﬁed innovations with the cycle is
0.449, and thus the procyclicality of the dispersion of capital innovations is not driven by measurement error.
11a linear trend for investment rate dispersion is conservative: using quadratic detrending and
especially an HP-ﬁlter makes the procyclicality much stronger. This holds nearly uniformly for
all the other variations and robustness checks as well as the signiﬁcance numbers in Table 3.
Finally, the last two rows demonstrate that the result is neither driven alone by the German
reuniﬁcation, nor by the strong recession in 1975.
Tables 6 and 7 show how the cyclicality of cross-sectional investment dispersion manifests
itself across sectors and ﬁrm sizes. For the sectoral numbers we use the cross-sectional stan-
dard deviation of the ﬁrm-level investment rate and the HP(100)-ﬁltered log-output of the cor-
responding sectors as inputs into the correlation measure. For the ﬁrm size numbers we use
HP(100)-ﬁltered log-output from the sectoral aggregate.
Table 6: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT DISPERSION - SECTORS
1-digit Sector ½(¾(
ii,t







Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. See Figure 2 for the sectoral acronyms.
Table6 showsthatprocyclicalityofinvestmentdispersionisstronglyprevalentinthegoods-
producingsectors,inparticularmanufacturing. Thetradesectorexhibitsasmallereffect,whereas
in the primary sectors investment dispersion is nearly acyclical or weakly countercyclical.18 To
puttheseﬁndingsinperspective,wealsodisplaythecyclicalityofthecross-sectionalinnovations-
to-Solow-residual dispersion, which – despite the procyclicality of investment dispersion – is
strongly countercyclical in the manufacturing and trade sectors. To sum up: manufacturing,
a sector where nonconvex adjustment technologies can be expected to be most prevalent, has
both the strongest countercyclically disperse driving force and the strongest procyclicality of
investment dispersion.
As Table 7 shows, procyclicality of investment dispersion is driven mainly by the smaller
ﬁrms,especiallywhensizeismeasuredbyemploymentorvalueadded. Largeﬁrms,incontrast,
displayonlyweaklyprocyclicaltoacyclicalinvestmentdispersion. Thisdistinctionissigniﬁcant
in the sense that at least if size is measured in terms of employment or value added, neither the
18Had we used the sectoral aggregate instead of own sector output as cyclical indicator, the results would be by
and large the same, except that the procyclicality of investment dispersion in the trade sector would more than
double with only half the countercylicality in the dispersion of the driving force.
12Table 7: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT DISPERSION - FIRM SIZE
Size Class / Criterion Employment Value Added Capital
Smallest 25% 0.583 0.601 0.391
25% to 50% 0.456 0.468 0.422
50% to 75% 0.366 0.330 0.387
Largest 25% 0.188 0.215 0.399
Largest 5% 0.050 0.048 0.184
point estimate for the smallest size class lies in the [5%,95%]¡bands of the largest size class nor
vice versa. 19
Finally, the last Table 8 shows that conditional on ﬁrm size – as measured by capital – the
ﬁnancial situation of a ﬁrm – as measured by the equity-asset-ratio – hardly matters for the
cyclicality of investment dispersion:
Table 8: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT DISPERSION - FINANCIAL SITUATION




Tables 6 to 8 together with the ﬁnding that the Solow residual processes for small and large
ﬁrmshardlydifferbothonaverageovertimeandintermsofcyclicalityoftheirinnovations,20 at
least suggests that the friction necessary to explain the differential cyclicality of the dispersions
of ﬁrm-level innovations-to-Solow-residual and investment rates, respectively, can neither be
found in ﬁnancial constraints nor principally in different shock processes. It also does not ap-
peartobedrivenbycertainsectorsandlargeﬁrms. Werelegateadiscussionofpotentialcyclical
sample selection to Appendix B and show there that it is not an issue.
Instead, we show in this paper that the presence of lumpy capital adjustment is a plausible
cause for this aspect of the cross-sectional ﬁrm dynamics. Indeed, the fact that procyclical in-
vestment dispersion is mostly prevalent in the manufacturing sector as well as in smaller ﬁrms,
i.e. ﬁrms where we would a priori expect non-convexities in the adjustment technology to be
most relevant, is at least consistent with our explanation.
19See Appendix A.1 for detailed information on the size distribution of ﬁrms in our sample.
20See Bachmann and Bayer (2009) for an in-depth discussion of this fact.
13Other Data Sources
Naturally the question arises whether it is speciﬁc to the German data used that we ﬁnd
the dispersion of investment rates to be procyclical. To asses this we compare to data from
the UK DTI-database and to Compustat data from the US. The UK data comprises 10,966 ﬁrm-
year observations after removal of outliers and constraining the sample to ﬁrms with at least 5
observations, applying the same criteria as for the USTAN data. The UK data covers the period
1977-1990 and stems from a representative sample of ﬁrms (but over-sampling large ﬁrms) in
the manufacturing and some selected non-ﬁnancial service sectors in Britain. For the US we
use Compustat annual accounts from 1968-2006. This yields for the US a ﬁnal sample of 67,394
ﬁrm-year observations applying again the same sampling criteria as for the USTAN data.
Table 9 presents the results for these two data sets. The results are much in line with our
ﬁndings for the USTAN data: For the UK data set, which comprises a larger fraction of smaller
ﬁrms, we ﬁnd a robust positive correlation of the dispersion of investment rates with the cycle,
irrespective of how we measure dispersion and cycle.
For the Compustat sample, we ﬁnd a lower (though positive) correlation of the investment
rate dispersion with the cycle. This reﬂects that, in contrast to both the DTI data base and
the USTAN data, Compustat covers only large, publicly traded companies. The ﬁrms in the
Compustat sample are typically larger than even the top 5% largest ﬁrms in the USTAN data
and we have seen for the USTAN data that for larger ﬁrms the correlation coefﬁcient drops.21
Table 9: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT DISPERSION - EVIDENCE FROM THE



























Notes: Aggregate output data, Y , for the US refers to real gross value added in the non-ﬁnancial private business
sector. For the UK we use aggregate real gross-value-added instead, as the corresponding sectoral data is not
publicly available for the corresponding time period. Dispersion measures are linearly de-trended.
21All results are robust to alternative detrending methods for the dispersion of investment rates such as ﬁtting
quadratic or cubic time-trends or HP-ﬁltering. Results are available upon request.
142.4 The Extensive Margin
As we have argued in the Introduction, the mechanism by which the model generates a pro-
cyclical dispersion of investment rates is the procyclicality of the extensive margin of invest-
ment. Table 10 provides direct evidence on this. It displays the numbers for Figure 2 in the
introduction as well as some robustness. The aggregate features strong procyclicality of the ex-
tensive margin,22 as does the manufacturing sector. The service sectors have a middle place,
whereas the primary sectors by and large display low and non-robust or zero procyclicality of
the extensive margin. For the construction sector the results are somewhat mixed, but overall
still show procyclicality.
Table 10: CYCLICALITY OF THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN








Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. See Figure 2 for the sectoral acronyms. The fraction of adjusters (Frac. of adj.) is
deﬁned as ﬁrms with an investment rate of: j
ii,t
0.5(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)j È 0.01. The fraction of lumpy adjusters (Frac. of lumpy
adj.) is deﬁned as ﬁrms with an investment rate of: j
ii,t
0.5(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)j È 0.2. Both are linearly detrended. HP(100)¡Y
refers to the cyclical component of aggregate output in the ﬁrst row, thereafter to the output of the corresponding
sector.
3 The Model
In this section we describe our model economy. We start with the ﬁrm’s problem, followed by
a brief description of the households and the deﬁnition of equilibrium. We conclude with a
sketch of the equilibrium computation. We follow closely Khan and Thomas (2008) and Bach-
mann et al. (2008). Since the model set up is discussed in detail there, we will be rather brief
here.
The main departure from either papers is the introduction of a second exogenous aggregate
state, the standard deviation of the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity shocks tomorrow,
22If we deﬁne the lumpiness threshold with 0.1, the aggregate number is 0.689.
15¾(²0). The motivation for this is both realism, as we ﬁnd these second-moment shocks in the
data, but also conservatism: we will show in Section 5.1 that without countercyclical second-
moment shocks the investment rate dispersion is very procyclical, more so than in the data,
even with very small ﬁxed costs to adjustment. This comes as no surprise, as without counter-
cyclical second-moment shocks there is no countervailing force that would undo the extensive
margin effect that in turn causes the investment rate dispersion to be procyclical. Thus, since
this is a quantitative exercise using the correct amount of second-moment volatility and coun-
tercyclicality in the driving force is important. Following Khan and Thomas (2008), we approxi-
mate this now bivariate aggregate state process with a discrete Markov chain.
3.1 Firms
The economy consists of a unit mass of small ﬁrms. We do not model entry and exit decisions.
Thereisonecommodityintheeconomythatcanbeconsumedorinvested. Eachﬁrmproduces
this commodity, employing its pre-determined capital stock (k) and labor (n), according to the
following Cobb-Douglas decreasing-returns-to-scale production function (µ È 0, º È 0, µÅº Ç
1):
y Æ z²kµnº, (1)
where z and ² denote aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc (idiosyncratic) technology, respectively.
The idiosyncratic technology process has autocorrelation ½I. It follows a Markov chain,
whose transition matrix depends on the aggregate state of its time-varying standard deviation,
¾(²). In contrast, its support is independent of the aggregate state. To also capture observed
excess kurtosis in the idiosyncratic productivity shocks, we use a mixture of two Gaussian dis-
tributions in the Tauchen-approximation algorithm instead of the usual normal distribution.23
Wedenotethetrendgrowthrateofaggregateproductivityby(1¡µ)(°¡1),sothataggregate y
andk growatrate°¡1alongthebalancedgrowthpath. Fromnowonweworkwithk and y (and
laterC) in efﬁciency units. The linearly detrended logarithm of aggregate productivity levels as
well as linearly detrended ¾(²) evolve according to a VAR(1) process, with normal innovations v











where ¯ ¾(²) denotes the steady state standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity inno-
vations.24
23Tauchen (1986). For details, see Section 4.




, in order to avoid negativity of the standard deviation of idiosyn-
16Productivity innovations at different aggregation levels are independent. Also, idiosyncratic
productivity shocks are independent across productive units. In contrast, we do not impose
any restrictions on ­ or %A 2R2£2.
Each period a ﬁrms draws from a time-invariant distribution, G, its current cost of capital
adjustment, » ¸ 0, which is denominated in units of labor. G is a uniform distribution on [0, ¯ »],
common to all ﬁrms. Draws are independent across ﬁrms and over time, and employment is
freely adjustable.
At the beginning of a period, a ﬁrm is characterized by its pre-determined capital stock, its
idiosyncratic productivity, and its capital adjustment cost. Given this and the aggregate state,
it decides its employment level, n, production and depreciation occurs, workers are paid, and
investment decisions are made. Then the period ends.
Upon investment, i, the ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost of !», where ! is the current real wage rate.
Capital depreciates at rate ±. We can then summarize the evolution of the ﬁrm’s capital stock
(in efﬁciency units) between two consecutive periods, from k to k0, as follows:
Fixed cost paid °k0
i 6Æ0: !» (1¡±)k Åi
i Æ0: 0 (1¡±)k
Given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, it is sufﬁcient to describe differences across





constitutes the current aggregate state and ¹ evolves according to the law
of motion ¹0 Æ¡(z,¾(²0),¹), which ﬁrms take as given.
Next we describe the dynamic programming problem of each ﬁrm. We will take two short-
cuts (details can be found in Khan and Thomas, 2008). First, we state the problem in terms of
utilsoftherepresentativehousehold(ratherthanphysicalunits),anddenotebyp Æ p(z,¾(²0),¹)
the marginal utility of consumption. Second, given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs,
continuation values can be expressed without explicitly taking into account future adjustment
costs.
Let V 1(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹) denote the expected discounted value—in utils—of a ﬁrm that is in
idiosyncratic state (²,k,»), given the aggregate state (z,¾(²0),¹). Then the expected value prior





cratic productivity shocks is – given its high steady state value and relatively low variability (see Bachmann and
Bayer, 2009) – an unnecessary precaution that does not change the results.






and does not adjust, and Vadj the continuation value, net of adjustment costs AC, if the ﬁrm
adjusts its capital stock. That is:
CFÆ[z²kµnº¡!(z,¾(²0),¹)n]p(z,¾(²0),¹), (5a)
Vno adj Æ¯E[V 0(²0,(1¡±)k/°;z0,¾(²00),¹0)], (5b)
AC Æ»!(z,¾(²0),¹)p(z,¾(²0),¹), (5c)
Vadj Æ¡ip(z,¾(²0),¹)Å¯E[V 0(²0,k0;z0,¾(²00),¹0)], (5d)
where both expectation operators average over next period’s realizations of the aggregate and
idiosyncratic productivity states, conditional on this period’s values, and we recall that i Æ°k0¡
(1¡±)k. Also, ¯ denotes the discount factor of the representative household.
Takingasgivenprices!(z,¾(²0),¹)and p(z,¾(²0),¹),andthelawofmotion¹0 Æ¡(z,¾(²0),¹),
the ﬁrm chooses optimally labor demand, whether to adjust its capital stock at the end of the
period,andtheoptimalcapitalstock,conditionalonadjustment. Thisleadstopolicyfunctions:
N Æ N(²,k;z,¾(²0),¹) and K Æ K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹). Since capital is pre-determined, the optimal
employment decision is independent of the current adjustment cost draw.
3.2 Households
We assume a continuum of identical households that have access to a complete set of state-
contingent claims. Hence, there is no heterogeneity across households. Moreover, they own
shares in the ﬁrms and are paid dividends. We do not need to model the household side in
detail (see Khan and Thomas (2008) for the details), and concentrate instead on the ﬁrst-order
conditions to determine the equilibrium wage and the marginal utility of consumption.
Households have a standard felicity function in consumption and (indivisible) labor:
U(C,Nh)ÆlogC ¡ ANh, (6)
whereC denotesconsumptionand Nh thehousehold’slaborsupply. Householdsmaximizethe




















1. Firm optimality: Taking !, p and ¡ as given, V 1(²,k;z,¾(²0),¹) solves (4) and the corre-
sponding policy functions are N(²,k;z,¾(²0),¹) and K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹).
2. Household optimality: Taking ! and p as given, the household’s consumption and labor
supply satisfy (7) and (8).




Z Z ¯ »
0
[°K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹)¡(1¡±)k]dGd¹.











where J(x)Æ0, if x Æ0 and 1, otherwise.
5. Modelconsistentdynamics: Theevolutionofthecross-sectionthatcharacterizestheecon-
omy, ¹0 Æ ¡(z,¾(²0),¹), is induced by K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹) and the exogenous processes for
z, ¾(²0) as well as ².
Conditions1, 2, 3and4deﬁneanequilibriumgiven¡, whilestep5speciﬁestheequilibrium
condition for ¡.
193.4 Solution
As is well-known, (4) is not computable, since ¹ is inﬁnite dimensional. Hence, we follow
Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) and approximate the distribution ¹ by its ﬁrst moment over
capital, and its evolution, ¡, by a simple log-linear rule. In the same vein, we approximate the
equilibrium pricing function by a log-linear rule, discrete aggregate state by discrete aggregate
state:

















log ¯ k, (9b)
where ¯ k denotesaggregate capital holdings. Given(8), wedo nothave to specify anequilibrium
rule for the real wage. As usual with this procedure, we posit this form and check that in equi-
librium it yields a good ﬁt to the actual law of motion. In contrast to models without second
moment shocks, where it has been extensively shown that the ﬁrst moment sufﬁces, we show
here that the pure R2 goodness-of-ﬁt metric does not perform as well anymore: R2 below 0.9
are possible, as we shall see in Section 5.2. Nevertheless, Bachmann and Bayer (2009) show that
the aggregate dynamics of such an economy are hardly affected, when higher moments of the
capital distribution are included and the R2 are pushed closer to unity (see Bachmann et al.
(2008) for a similar observation). We show here that also the cross-sectional dynamics are af-
fectedonlytoasmalldegree. Andsinceweconsistentlyﬁndthatnotincludinghighermoments
leads to a slight underestimation of the procyclicality of investment dispersion, we prefer the
increase in computational speed and report our results, unless otherwise noted, with the ﬁrst
moment only as a state variable.
Combining these assumptions and substituting ¯ k for ¹ into (4) and using (9a)–(9b), we
have that (4) becomes a computable dynamic programming problem with policy functions
N Æ N(²,k;z,¾(²0), ¯ k) and K Æ K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0), ¯ k). We solve this problem via value function
iteration on V 0.
With these policy functions, we can then simulate a model economy without imposing the
equilibrium pricing rule (9b), but rather solve for it along the way. We simulate the model
economy for 1,600 time periods and discard the ﬁrst 100 observations, when computing any
statistics. This procedure generates a time series of {pt} and {¯ kt} endogenously, with which as-
sumed rules (9a)–(9b) can be updated via a simple OLS regression. The procedure stops when

















sufﬁciently close to the previous ones. We skip the details of this procedure, as this has been
outlined elsewhere – see Khan and Thomas (2008) and Bachmann et al. (2008).
204 Calibration
The model period is a year – in congruence with the data frequency in USTAN. The following
parameters have standard values: ¯ Æ 0.98 and ± Æ 0.094, which we compute from German
national accounting data for the sectoral aggregate that the USTAN sample corresponds to: the
non-ﬁnancialprivatebusinesssector. Giventhisdepreciationrate,wepick°Æ1.014,inorderto
matchthetime-averageaggregateinvestmentrate of0.108. Thisnumberis alsoconsistentwith
German long-run growth rates. The log-felicity function features an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS) of one. The disutility of work parameter, A, is chosen to generate an average
time spent at work of 0.33: A Æ2 for the baseline calibration.
We set the output elasticities of labor and capital to º Æ 0.5565 and µ Æ 0.2075, respectively,
which correspond to the measured median labor and capital shares in manufacturing in the
USTAN data base (see Appendix A.4). While our data also include a considerable amount of
ﬁrms from other sectors, any weighted average or median of these shares would still be close to
the manufacturing values, which is why we decided to use them in our baseline calibration. We
discuss robustness to this parameter choice in Section 5.1 and Appendix A.4.25
Next, we have to choose the parameters of the two-state aggregate shock process. Here we
simply estimate a bivariate, unrestricted VAR with the linearly detrended natural logarithm of
the aggregate Solow residual26 and the linearly detrended ¾(²)-process from the USTAN data.27













We measure the steady state standard deviation of idiosyncratic technology innovations as
¯ ¾(²)Æ0.1201. Sincetheseinnovationsalsoexhibitmildexcesskurtosis–4.4480onaverageover
our time horizon –,29 and since the adjustment cost parameter ¯ » will be identiﬁed by the kurto-
sis of the ﬁrm-level investment rate (in addition to its skewness), we want to avoid attributing
25If one views the DRTS assumption as a mere stand-in for a CRTS production function with monopolistic com-
petition, than these choices would correspond to an employment elasticity of the underlying production function
of 0.7284 and a markup of 1
µÅº Æ1.31. Given the regulated product markets in Germany, this is a reasonable value.
The implied capital elasticity of the revenue function, µ
1¡º is 0.47. Finally, model simulations show that using the
capital share as an estimate for the output elasticity of capital under the null hypothesis of the model leads to a
small overestimation of the latter, which, as we will show in Section 5.1, leads to the the baseline calibration being
conservative relative to the main result: procyclicality of investment dispersion.
26We use again ºÆ0.5565 and µ Æ0.2075 in these calculations.
27After ﬁrm-level and sectoral ﬁxed effects have been removed.
28With a slight abuse of notation, but for the sake of readability, ­ displays standard deviations on the main
diagonal and correlations on the off diagonal.
29We ﬁnd no skewness.
21excess kurtosis in the ﬁrm-level investment rate to nonlinearities in the adjustment technology,
when the driving force itself has kurtosis. Hence, we incorporate the measured excess kurtosis
into the discretization process for the idiosyncratic technology state.30 Finally, we set ½I Æ0.95,
in accordance with the high persistence of Solow residual innovations we ﬁnd in the data. This







the adjustment costs parameter ¯ » to minimize a quadratic form in the normalized differences
between the time-average ﬁrm-level investment rate skewness produced by the model and the




























As can be seen from (11), the distribution of ﬁrm-level investment rates exhibits both sub-
stantial positive skewness – 2.1920 – as well as kurtosis – 20.0355. Caballero et al. (1995) doc-
ument a similar fact for U.S. manufacturing plants. They also argue that non-convex capital
adjustmentcostsareanimportantingredienttoexplainsuchastronglynon-Gaussiandistribu-
tion, given a close-to-Gaussian shock process. We therefore use the deviation from Gaussianity
in ﬁrm-level investment rates to identify ¯ ».
The following Table 11 demonstrates identiﬁcation of ¯ », as cross-sectional skewness and
kurtosis of the ﬁrm-level investment rates are both monotonically increasing in ¯ ». The mini-
mum of the distance measure ª is achieved for ¯ » Æ 0.3, our baseline case.33 This implies costs
conditional on adjustment equivalent to 15.4% of annual ﬁrm-level output on average, which
is well in line with estimates from the U.S. (see Bloom, 2009). A description of the aggregate
dynamics of the baseline calibration is relegated to Appendix C.
30We achieve this by using a mixture of two Gaussian distributions: N(0,0.0777) and N(0,0.1625) – the standard
deviations are 0.1201§0.0424 – with a weight of 0.4118 on the ﬁrst distribution.
31The cross-sectional results do not change signiﬁcantly with either an increase in the ﬁneness of the aggregate
grid to [9£9], nor with one in the idiosyncratic grid to a 35¡state-grid.
32The normalization constants in (11) are, respectively, the time series standard deviation of the investment rate
skewness and the time series standard deviation of the investment rate kurtosis.
33We searched over a ﬁner grid of ¯ » than displayed in the table, in order to ﬁnd the optimal ¯ ».
22Table 11: CALIBRATION OF ADJUSTMENT COSTS - ¯ »
¯ » Skewness Kurtosis ª(¯ ») Adj. costs/
Unit of Output
0.01 0.7852 5.0389 11.5082 1.5%
0.05 1.5168 7.6444 6.0062 4.2%
0.1 1.9340 9.3327 3.9157 6.8%
0.2 2.4011 11.4056 2.547 11.3%
0.3 (BL) 2.6915 12.8042 2.2402 15.4%
0.5 3.0686 14.7669 2.5035 23.3%
1 3.5926 17.8112 4.2169 43.3%
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Can a thus calibrated DSGE model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks, ﬁxed adjustment
costs to capital and countercyclical innovations to the dispersion of ﬁrm-level Solow residuals
reproduce the cyclicality of the cross-sectional dynamics observed in the data?
Table 12 summarizes our main result numerically: in our baseline calibration the model
matches the procyclicality of ﬁrm-level investmentrate dispersion as well as the extensive mar-
gin reasonably well, even though it was calibrated to the steady state Non-Gaussianity of the
investment rate distribution.34 We use HP(100)-ﬁltered aggregate model output as the cyclical
indicator. The countercyclical dispersions of value added and employment changes are also
captured very well.
Table 12: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION - BASELINE MODEL








Fraction of adjusters 0.727 0.485
Notes: CorrelationcoefﬁcientsbetweenHP(100)-ﬁlteredoutputandacross-sectionalstandarddeviation. Fraction
of adjusters is deﬁned as ﬁrms with an investment rate of: j
ii,t
0.5(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)j È 0.01. The column ‘Model’ refers to the
correlation coefﬁcients from a simulation of the model over T Æ1500 periods.
34These numbers are obtained from a simulation of T Æ 1500. Using an even longer simulation of T Æ 3000 and
breaking it up into 60 pieces of T Æ 26 (the length of the USTAN sample) independent time series produces an
average value of 0.652 for the correlation between investment rate dispersion and cyclical output with a standard
deviation of: 0.113. The range is [0.390,0.845], which includes the point estimate of the data.
23Figure 3 shows that indeed the model produces procyclical investment dispersion close to
the one found in the data and shown in Figure 1 in the introduction. Likewise, Figure 8 in Ap-
pendix A.5 shows a simulated time path of investment dispersion that clearly exhibits positive
comovement with aggregate output.
Figure 3: Cross-sectional Dispersion of Firm-Level Investment Rates and Solow Residual Inno-
vations









































Notes: Dispersion refers to the cross sectional standard-deviation.
ThenextTable13 illustrateshowlumpycapitaladjustmentandcountercyclicalsecondmo-
ment shocks interact to generate the procyclicality result.
Two ﬁndings are important: in the presence of countercyclical second moment shocks, the
procyclicality of investment dispersion is a gradually and monotonically increasing function of
the adjustment cost parameter. What is perhaps surprising is that the level of adjustment costs
that best matches the cross-sectional average skewness and kurtosis of ﬁrm-level investment
rates – two statistics that have been known to be related to the level of nonconvexities at the
micro-level (see Caballero et al., 1995) – also leads to a model that almost matches an impor-
tant time series moment of the cross-sectional business cycle dynamics. Had we matched the
latter almost exactly, we would have chosen an adjustment cost parameter of 0.2, a value only
somewhat below our baseline calibration. The table also shows that a more conservative cali-
bration that calibrates to the cross-sectional skewness of ﬁrm-level investment rates only and
24Table 13: ADJUSTMENT COSTS AND CYCLICALITY OF INVESTMENT DISPERSION AND THE EXTEN-
SIVE MARGIN








0.15 (skewness only) 0.334 0.870
0.2 0.444 0.873




Notes: See notes to Table 12. Note that for the case with ¯ » Æ 0 and no second-moment shocks any time series
variation of ¾(
ii,t
0.5(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)) is a numerical artifact, which means that its correlation coefﬁcient with output is not
deﬁned. %A Æ0.5259 and ­Æ0.0182 for the univariate case.
puts zero weight on their kurtosis, still generates a sizeable level of procyclicality in investment
dispersion. By contrast, the frictionless case merely replicates the countercyclicality of the dis-
persion of the driving force.
Moreover, the second column of this table shows that without second moment shocks, a
very low level of non-convexity immediately generates procyclicality in investment dispersion
–thegradientofprocyclicalityintheadjustmentcostfactor, ¯ », isextremelysteepwithoutcoun-
tercyclical second moment shocks.35 But it also makes the model overshoot this number con-
siderably. Thus,countercyclicalsecondmomentshocksareanimportantpartinunderstanding
cross-sectional ﬁrm dynamics, both in generating countercyclical dispersions of value and em-
ployment changes, but also to generate realistic procyclicality in investment dispersion. With-
out them, it would simply be too easy to generate the latter. We view this as an important
conﬁrmation of our calibration and our mechanism: in the presence of quantitatively real-
istic countercyclicality of the dispersion of the driving force, it is a level of adjustment costs
that matches best the nonlinear average moments of the investment rate distribution that also
generates about the right correlation coefﬁcient between the standard deviation of investment
rates and aggregate output. Table 13 shows that this identiﬁcation is rather tight.
35Notice that the proposition in the introduction suggests that for low enough adjustment cost parameters and
for an important enough role of the extensive margin we should expect countercylicality of investment rate dis-
persion even without countercyclical second moment shocks.
25Table 14 illustrates how the procyclicality of the investment dispersion and the procyclical-
ity of the extensive margin interact with the curvature of the revenue function in capital.
Table 14: FACTOR ELASTICITIES AND CYCLICALITY OF INVESTMENT DISPERSION
Cross-sectional Moment Baseline (0.47) Rev. Ela.=0.57 Rev. Ela.=0.63
¾(
ii,t
0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)) 0.580 -0.102 -0.492
Fraction of Adjusters 0.485 -0.295 -0.603
Notes: See notes to Table 12. ‘Rev. Ela.’ stands for the revenue elasticity of capital in a reduced form revenue
function, after labor has been maximized out. It is given by µ
1¡º. Using the convention of Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006), we deﬁne the fraction of adjusters as those ﬁrms that have annual investment rates of absolute value larger
than 1%.
The results in columns two and three refer to setups with factor elasticities º Æ 0.5333, µ Æ
0.2667 and ºÆ0.5556, µ Æ0.2778, respectively, compared to ºÆ0.5565, µ Æ0.2075 in the base-
line scenario.36 It is clear that larger revenue elasticities in capital after labor has been maxi-
mized out, imply a lower procyclicality of the extensive margin and thus for the investment rate
dispersion. Smaller revenue elasticities or higher curvature of the production function imply
that the intensive margin of investment becomes less ﬂexible: the range of the optimal capital
returnlevelinthebaselinescenariois[0.0261,41.9135], forthesecondcolumn[0.0183,98.6497]
and [0.0073,175.0381] for the third column; all with the same process for idiosyncratic technol-
ogy. To achieve the optimal path for aggregate investment, the extensive margin becomes more
important for the ﬁrms, the higher the curvature of the revenue function. This effect of curva-
ture is well known and explained in detail in Gourio and Kashyap (2007).
Finally, Table 15 shows the effect of general equilibrium on both the procyclicality of the
extensive margin as well as the procyclicality of investment dispersion. Real wage and interest
rate movements lead to aggregate coordination and therefore to procyclicality of the fraction of
adjusters. This in turn increases the cyclical comovement of both the investment rate disper-
sion, as the following Table 15 shows. As we have shown above, both quantities are strongly
procyclical in the data. We thus conﬁrm the conjecture in Khan and Thomas (2005) that gen-
eral equilibrium price movements are important to quantitatively account for cross-sectional
business cycle dynamics.
To sum up, the extent of both, the procyclicality of investment dispersion as well as the
countercyclicality of the dispersion of ﬁrm-level Solow residual innovations, impose important
36In a monopolistic competition framework, column two implies a scenario with a CRTS-one-third-two-third
production function and a markup of 1.25, column three a markup of 1.20. In each case, we recompute ﬁrm-level
and aggregate Solow residuals, estimate a new driving process (2) and re-calibrate the adjustment cost parameter
¯ » to minimize ª(¯ ») in (11). For the second column this leads to ¯ »Æ0.45, and ¯ »Æ0.5 for the third column.
26Table 15: CYCLICALITY OF INVESTMENT DISPERSION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM




Fraction of Adjusters 0.485 -0.0222
Notes: See notes to Tables 12. ‘GE’ stands for general equilibrium and means a model simulation with market
clearing wages and interest rates. ‘PE’ stands for partial equilibrium and means a model simulation, where wages
and interest rates are held constant at the average level in the ‘GE’-simulation.
and very tight restrictions on important structural parameters, such as adjustment frictions
and factor elasticities in the production function. More generally, this makes the study of cross-
sectional business cycle dynamics important for the structure and calibration of heterogenous-
ﬁrm models. We also conﬁrm the conjecture in Khan and Thomas (2005) that general equilib-
rium price movements are important to quantitatively account for the cross-sectional business
cycle dynamics observed in the data.
5.2 Robustness
In the following Table 16 we document robustness of our baseline result to some of the choices
we have made in the baseline calibration.





Double volatility of ¾(¢²i,t) -0.006
Quadruple volatility of ¾(¢²i,t) -0.283
CRRA Æ3 0.560
Timing of ¾(¢²i,t) 0.694
Log-weighting 0.731
mean(¢²i,t) 0.757
Notes: See notes to Table 12.
In order to check robustness of our results to a potential underestimation of the volatility
of the countercyclical second-moment shock, we double (and quadruple) it, while keeping its
steady state value ﬁxed at ¯ ¾(²) Æ 0.1201. To this end, we rescale the ¾(²)-process by a factor of
two (four) when simulating the model. As expected, now the ability of the procyclical exten-
sive margin effect to overcome the countercyclical second-moment shocks is limited, because
the latter ﬂuctuates more. This drives down the correlation of the investment rate dispersion
27and the cyclical component of aggregate output to zero and approximately ¡0.3, respectively.
Notice, however, that it is still the case that non-convexities in capital adjustment cause an ex-
tensive margin effect that partially offsets the countercyclical second-moment shocks, as the
frictionless counterparts of these two high volatility speciﬁcations feature correlation coefﬁ-
cientsofinvestmentdispersionwithoutputof-0.551and-0.535, respectively. Butitisalsoclear
from this exercise that the strongly procyclical investment dispersion that we ﬁnd in the data
– +0.451 – is at odds with the even more, eightfold as volatile countercyclical second-moment
shocks proposed in Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2009) as important drivers of the business
cycle. Next, we check whether our unity CRRA is driving our result by increasing the CRRA to
3. This leads to hardly any change.37 Furthermore, we check whether the result is sensitive to
the timing assumption about the revelation of the dispersion of the ﬁrm-level Solow residual
innovation. The baseline model assumes that ¾(¢²i,tÅ1) is revealed today in t, concomitantly
with zt and ²t, aggregate and idiosyncratic technology, which means investors know about the
actualproductivityrisktomorrowatthetimeoftheinvestmentdecision. Thereisanotherplau-
sible timing assumption: only ¾(¢²i,t) is revealed today in t, and both zt and ¾(¢²i,t) predict
the dispersion of the ﬁrm-level Solow residual innovation tomorrow through persistence in the
VAR in equation (10). As the fourth row shows, this increases somewhat the procyclicality of in-
vestmentdispersion,asthecorrespondingnumberfromafrictionlessmodelwouldbe¡0.3845,
comparedtothe¡0.5432inthefrictionlesscounterpartofthebaselinetimingassumption. The
effect through the countercyclical driving force in this case is simply more indirect. The next
to last row shows that using a normalized calibration criterion, ª(¯ »), in (11) as opposed to, say,
log-deviations between model simulated skewness and kurtosis of investment rates, was a con-
servative choice. Had we used the latter – and therefore calibrated ¯ » Æ 0.5 –, we would have
found an even stronger procyclicality of the investment rate dispersion. Finally, we replace the
aggregateSolowresidualwiththeaverageﬁrm-levelSolowresidualfromUSTANinthebivariate
aggregate driving force, which somewhat increases the procyclicality of investment dispersion.
Measurement Error
Measuring Solow residuals is potentially fraud with error. Indeed, when we take measure-
ment error in our ﬁrm-level Solow residual calculation into account, we ﬁnd that the average
standarddeviationoftheinnovationstothisSolowresidual, ¯ ¾(²),declinesfrom0.120to0.091.38
37Technically, with the separable felicity speciﬁcation in (6) there is no balanced growth path with CRRA=3. The
model remains consistent with balanced growth, if the disutility of leisure grows with the steady state growth rate,
°, and the fundamental discount rate is accordingly adjusted.
38Assuming additive classical measurement error in ﬁrm-level log-Solow residuals and a time-invariant mea-
surement error variance, we can use the time-average of the difference between the one-period innovation to ob-
served ﬁrm-level log-Solow residuals and half the variance of the two-period innovations to estimate the variance
of measurement error. Subtracting this number (twice) from the observed variance of one-period innovations to
28We therefore recompute and recalibrate our model with a driving force that is corrected for this
measurement error. The adjustment cost parameter is lowered to ¯ » Æ 0.25. As Table 17 shows,
this increases dramatically the procyclicality of investment dispersion. The model overshoots.
The next two lines explain why. We keep the ﬂuctuations of the computed Solow residual inno-
vation dispersion as in the baseline model, but lower mechanically its long-run average and
recalibrate the adjustment cost parameter, respectively to ¯ » Æ 0.25 and ¯ » Æ 0.15. There are
two effects to consider: for a ﬁxed adjustment cost parameter lowering the long-run average
of the second-moment driving force mechanically increases the coefﬁcient of variation of the
latter, which in isolation drives down the procyclicality of investment dispersion. At the same
time, lowering the long-run average dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks also means
that the adjustment costs parameter is relatively high compared to the remaining idiosyncratic
uncertainty, which strengthens the extensive margin effect and on net the procyclicality of in-
vestment dispersion. The second effect means that this too high adjustment cost parameter
overshoots now the optimal level to match skewness and kurtosis of the long-run investment
rate distribution. That is why we recalibrate ¯ » downward. However, this is not enough to offset
the positive net effect on the procyclicality of investment dispersion.






Three quarter ¯ ¾(²) 0.896
Half ¯ ¾(²) 0.954
Measurement Error + Rescaled volatility of zt (0.6) 0.585
Measurement Error + Double volatility of ¾(¢²i,t) 0.414
Measurement Error + Quadruple volatility of ¾(¢²i,t) -0.078
Notes: See notes to Table 12.
One concern with this calibration is that we have treated idiosyncratic and aggregate Solow
residuals differently, specifying the former with measurement error and the latter not. The ﬁfth
row addressesthisconcernwhichisreﬂectedbythe factthataggregatevolatility inourbaseline
calibration is too high (see Appendix C). If this high volatility was due to measurement error,
then we would unduly increase the relative importance of ﬁrst-moment shocks versus second-
moment shocks. A calibration where we re-scale the volatility of aggregate Solow residuals – by
afactorof0.6–tomatchtheobservedvolatilityofaggregateoutputintheGermanNIPAdatain-
ﬁrm-level log-Solow residuals yields an estimate of the true variance of the innovations to ﬁrm-level log-Solow
residuals.
29deed lowers again the simulated procyclicality of investment dispersion. However, it is still very
much in line with the data, in fact very close to our baseline calibration, where measurement
error at any level was ignored.
The last two lines of Table 17 ﬁnally show that when we again take into account measure-
ment error inthe microeconomic drivingforce only, the procyclicality ofinvestment dispersion
still puts a sharp upper bound on the relative importance of countercyclical second-moment
shocks proposed in Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2009). They basically cannot exceed an
unconditional time-series percentage standard deviation of twice 4.72%, where the latter is the
percentagevolatilityof¾(²)aftermeasurementerroristakenintoaccount. Noticethatrescaling
the aggregate Solow residual would only lower that number and make the bound sharper.
Higher Moments in the Krusell and Smith Rules
It remains to be shown that our result is not driven by the choice of only the average capital
stock in the Krusell and Smith rules (9a) and (9b). While it is the case that in the presence of
countercyclical second-moment shocks the conventional R2¡measure is fairly low – at least in
somecombinationsofthediscreteaggregatestates,theminimumis0.8701–,andwhileitisalso
true that including the skewness of the capital distribution39 leads to an average increase of the
R2 for the capital regressions from 0.9378 to 0.9870 and for the marginal utility of consumption
regressions from 0.9962 to 0.9986, neither the aggregate behavior (see Bachmann and Bayer
(2009) for details) nor the cross-sectional dynamics of the model are signiﬁcantly altered: the
correlation between investment dispersion and cyclical aggregate output raises slightly from
0.580 to 0.639.40 That means, if anything, our baseline numerical speciﬁcation is somewhat
conservative with respect to our main ﬁnding.41 The bottom line, however, is that better fore-
casts do not necessarily induce the agents to behave differently (see Bachmann et al. (2008) for
a similar ﬁnding).
The scatter plots in Figure 4 make this point graphically: the positive relationship between
investment dispersion and cyclical aggregate output is nearly indistinguishable between a nu-
merical speciﬁcation where only average capital is used as a state variable and one, where also
the skewness of ﬁrm-level capital is included in the forecasting rules.
39Including the standard deviation of capital does not yield any signiﬁcant improvements in R2. The average R2
over all discrete states for the skewness regression, that is analogous to (9a), is 0.9261.
40We ﬁnd even somewhat better improvements in the R2 and a similarly small increase in the procyclicality of
investment dispersion, when instead we include the standard deviation of log ﬁrm-level Solow residuals as an
additional moment in the Krusell and Smith rules. Numbers are available on request.
41Ourﬁndingthattheprocyclicalityofinvestmentdispersionputsasharpupperboundonthecountercyclicality
of the dispersion of ﬁrm-level Solow residual innovations is also robust to including higher moments. Numbers
are available on request.
30Figure 4: Cross-sectional Dispersion of Firm-Level Investment Rates and Solow Residual Inno-
vations: Higher Moments
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5.3 Results from Sectoral Calibrations
To test our mechanism further, we use the 1-digit sectoral variation in the procyclicality of in-
vestmentdispersionandtheextensivemarginfromFigure2intheintroduction. Weviewthisas
an additional and suggestive exercise, given that for computational feasibility we have to make
an important shortcut. Instead of calibrating and computing a realistic six-sector general equi-
libriummodeloftheGermaneconomy,werunsixseparatespeciﬁcationsofourbaselineDSGE
model, where we adjust crucial parameters to sectoral statistics, but otherwise treat the corre-
sponding sector as the aggregate economy. Speciﬁcally, we calibrate the factor elasticities in
the production function to sectoral income shares and use our sectoral USTAN results both for
the long-run standard deviation (and the kurtosis)42 of the innovations to the ﬁrm-level Solow
residual, ¯ ¾(²), aswellasthetimeseriesprocessofthelatter. Wesetthesectorallong-rungrowth
rates to zero and calibrate the sectoral depreciation rates to match the sectoral long-run aggre-
gate investment rate. In the baseline exercise we also use sectoral Solow residuals as the ﬁrst
moment shock in the VAR in equation (2).43 Finally, given all these parameters we calibrate the
adjustment costs parameter, ¯ », to match a variance-weighted quadratic form in sectoral skew-
ness and kurtosis of the ﬁrm-level investment rates, analogous to (11). Table 30 in Appendix D
42As in the aggregate data we ﬁnd mild excess kurtosis and no skewness across the one-digit sectors. The exact
numbers are available from the authors on request.
43The exact speciﬁcations of these VARs for each sector are available from the authors on request. Table 31 in
Appendix D displays the results, when we use aggregate Solow residuals in the estimation of the driving process
and aggregate output as the cyclical indicator.
31displays the main calibration parameters for each sector. For computational reasons we leave




function relates to the cyclicality of investment dispersion, the low and slightly negative corre-
lation of investment dispersion in the agricultural sector – -0.192 (with own sectoral output, see
Table 6 in Section 2.4) and 0.151 (with aggregate output) – should come as no surprise and, in
fact, supports our mechanism without the aforementioned computational burden.44
Table 18: RESULTS FROM SECTORAL CALIBRATION
Sector ½(¾(
ii,t
0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)),HP(100)¡Y ) ½(Fraction of Adjusters,HP(100)¡Y )
Model Data Model Data
Aggregate 0.580 0.451 0.485 0.727
MIN 0.050 0.042 0.058 0.075
MAN 0.771 0.477 0.754 0.765
CON 0.684 0.435 0.565 0.428
TRD 0.909 0.209 0.920 0.559
TRA 0.223 0.404 0.250 0.237
Notes: See notes to Tables 12. See Figure 2 for the sectoral acronyms. HP(100)¡Y refers to the cyclical component
of aggregate output in the ﬁrst row, from the second row onwards to the cyclical component of the output of the
corresponding sector.
Table 18 displays the results for the correlations of investment dispersion and the extensive
margin, respectively, with own sector output.45 The correlation coefﬁcients between model
simulations and data are 0.446 for investment rate dispersion and 0.901 for the extensive mar-
gin. The corresponding rank correlations are 0.4 and 0.9, respectively. The model captures the
overall variation with mining and energy not displaying any cyclicality of either investment rate
dispersion or the extensive margin, the transportation and communication sector featuring a
middle position and manufacturing and construction having the strongest procyclicality. The
modelsforthelattersectorsslightlyoverestimateprocyclicality,fortheformeroneitisunderes-
timated. The biggest exception is the trade sector, where the models produce an almost perfect
procyclicality of both investment rate dispersion and the extensive margin, which is inconsis-
tent with the data. The explanation is simple: as can be gathered from Table 30 in Appendix D,
44For similar reasons, in the computation for the mining and energy sector we scale down the measured factor
elasticities by a factor of 0.9. This facilitates the numerics considerably without compromising our results.
45Tables 31 and 32 in Appendix D show the results with aggregate output and the own sector average cross-
sectional investment rate, respectively. The latter show a higher congruence between data and model numbers.
32we estimate the lowest revenue elasticity of capital in the trade sector – 0.403. This enormously
facilitates the extensive margin mechanism to an extent that is obviously at odds with the data.
It appears that we neglected a signiﬁcant factor in trade that can be adjusted but does not ap-
pearinourspeciﬁcationoftheproductionfunction. Oneadvantageofusingthecross-sectional
dynamics of investment is that it helps to identify this ﬂaw. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this
paper to offer a remedy for this discrepancy. We nevertheless view the overall sectoral results
in support of our basic mechanism, especially given the simplicity of the sectoral exercise, and
leave the trade “puzzle”for future research.
6 Final Remarks
This paper studies the cyclical behavior of the second moments of the cross-sections of ﬁrm-
level innovations to value added, Solow residuals, capital and employment. We show that even
in the presence of countercyclically disperse Solow residual innovations the dispersion of in-
vestment rates is signiﬁcantly and robustly procyclical. We also show that this can be quantita-
tively explained by realistically calibrated non-convex adjustment costs: a procyclical extensive
margin effect dominates the countercyclical dispersion in the driving force. Other potential ex-
planations, such as ﬁnancial frictions, are ruled out. We ﬁnally argue that the understanding of
the cross-sectional business cycle dynamics imposes important restrictions on structural pa-
rameters and driving forces. In particular, large countercyclical second moment shocks that
could generate sizeable business cycle dynamics would be incompatible with procyclical in-
vestment dispersion.
We view this as just the beginning of a new research program that attempts to understand
more comprehensively the time-series behavior of the entire cross-section of ﬁrms, not merely
the cyclicality of second moments. This will ultimately lead to a better microfoundation of
structural heterogeneous-ﬁrm models and contribute to making them suitable for policy anal-
ysis. We also plan to corroborate these new ﬁndings for more countries, in particular the U.S.
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35A Data Appendix
A.1 Description of the Sample
The Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet database (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik, USTAN
henceforth)hasbeenoriginallycreatedasaby-productofthebank’srediscountingactivities,an
importantinstrumentofmonetarypolicybeforetheintroductionoftheEuro. Whenacommer-
cial bank wished to pledge a commercial bill of exchange to the Bundesbank, the commercial
bank had to prove the creditworthiness of the bill. For that purpose the bank had to provide
the Bundesbank with balance sheet information of all parties who backed the bill of exchange.
By law, the Bundesbank could only accept bills backed by at least three parties known to be
creditworthy. This procedure allowed the Bundesbank to collect a data set with information
stemming from the balance sheets and the proﬁt and loss accounts of ﬁrms (see Stoess (2001),
von Kalckreuth (2003) and Doepke et al. (2005) for further details).
Quality standards of the data are particularly high. All mandatory data collected for USTAN
have been double-checked by Bundesbank staff. Hence, the data should contain unusually few
errors for a micro-data set. One drawback of USTAN is that with the introduction of the EURO,
the Bundesbank stopped buying commercial bills and collected ﬁrm balance sheet data only
irregularly and from publicly available sources. For this reason, the data set stops being useful
in 1999. Therefore, we only use data from 1971 to 1998, which leaves us with essentially 26 year
observations from 1973 to 1998 because of lagging and ﬁrst-differencing.
The coverage of the sample is broad, although it is technically not a representative sam-
ple due to the non-random sample design. It was also more common to use bills of exchange
in manufacturing and for incorporated companies, which biases our data somewhat towards
these kinds of ﬁrms. And, of course, the Bundesbank would only rediscount bills with a good
rating, so that the set of ﬁrms in USTAN is also somewhat biased to ﬁnancially healthy and
larger ﬁrms.
Nevertheless, USTANcoversawiderangeofﬁrms,sinceshort-termﬁnancingthroughcom-
mercial bills of exchange was common practice for many German companies across all busi-
ness sectors (see Table 20 below for the detailed sectoral composition of our ﬁnal sample). US-
TAN also has a broad ownership coverage ranging from incorporated ﬁrms as well as privately
owned companies, which distinguishes it from the Compustat data. Within the former group
USTAN covers both untraded corporations (e.g. limited liability ﬁrms, GmbH) as well as pub-
licly held companies (AG) – see Table 23 below. Finally, USTAN features also a relatively broad
size coverage, as we will show in Table 21 below for our ﬁnal sample, the creation of which we
describe in some detail now.
36We start out with the universe of observations in the USTAN data, merging the ﬁles for
1971-1986 and 1987-1998. In a ﬁrst pass, we then drop all balance sheets that are irregular,
e.g. bankruptcy or closing balance sheets, or stem from a group/holding (Konzernbilanz). This
leaves us with only regular balance sheets (Handelsbilanz or Steuerbilanz). We also drop all
ﬁrms with missing payroll data or missing or negative sales data, which are basically non-
operating ﬁrms. A small amount of duplicate balance sheets is removed as well. And ﬁnally, we
drop the following sectors: hospitality (hotels and restaurants), which has only a small amount
of ﬁrms in the database, ﬁnancial and insurance institutions, the mostly public health and ed-
ucation sectors, as well as other public companies like museums, etc. and some other small
service industries, such as hair cutters, dry cleaners and funeral homes;46 or when sectoral in-
formation was missing. The sectoral aggregate we are studying can be roughly characterized as
the non-ﬁnancial private business sector in Germany. This leaves us with an initial data set of
1,764,846 ﬁrm-year observations and 259,614 ﬁrms. The average number of ﬁrms per year is
63,030.
From this initial data set we remove step-by-step more observations, in order to get an eco-
nomically reasonable data set. We ﬁrst drop observations from likely East German ﬁrms to
avoid a break of the series in 1990. We identify a West German ﬁrm as a ﬁrm that has a West
German address or has no address information but enters the sample before 1990. Then we
recompute capital stocks with a modiﬁed perpetual inventory method (PIM) and employment
levels. In the modiﬁed PIM we drop a small amount of observations from the top and bottom
of the distribution of correction factors for the initial capital stock, see Appendix A.2. Extreme
correction factors indicate that constant depreciation is not a good approximation for this par-
ticular ﬁrm. Such a ﬁrm will have had an episode of extraordinary depreciation (e.g. ﬁre, a
natural disaster, etc.) and the capital stocks by PIM will be a bad measure of the actual capital
after the disaster. We remove observations that do not have a log value added and a log capital
stock after PIM. Another large part is removed due to not featuring changes in log ﬁrm-level
employment, capital and real value added, which obviously requires us to observe ﬁrms for two
consecutive years. Then we remove outliers in factor changes and real value added changes.
Speciﬁcally, we identify as outliers in our sample a ﬁrm-year in which the ﬁrm level investment
rate or log changes in ﬁrm-level real value added, employment and capital stock fall outside
a three standard deviations band around the ﬁrm and sectoral-year mean. Then we compute
ﬁrm-levelSolowresiduals(seeAppendixA.4fordetails)andsimilarlyremoveobservationswith
missinglogchangesinSolowresidualsaswellasoutlierstherein. Weﬁnallyremove–beforeand
46The number of ﬁrms from the public sector and these small industries is tiny to begin with, as they did not use
commercial bills as a ﬁnancing instrument. We left out ﬁnancial and insurance institutions, as they arguably have
a very different production function and investment behavior.
37after each step of the outlier removal – ﬁrms that have less than ﬁve observations in ﬁrm-level
Solow residual changes. We conduct extensive robustness checks of our results to the choices
for the outlier and observation thresholds (see Appendix B). Table 19 summarizes, how much
observations are dropped in each step.
Table 19: SAMPLE CREATION
Criterion Drops of Firm-Year Observations
East Germany 104,299
Outliers in PIM 7,539
Missing log value added 1,349
Missing log capital 31,819
Missing log-changes in N, K, VA 161,668
Outliers in factor and VA log-changes 41,453
Missing log-changes in Solow residual 126,086
Outliers in Solow residual log-changes 18,978
Not enough observations 417,550
Total 910,741
The ﬁnal sample then consists of 854,105 ﬁrm-year observations, which amounts to obser-
vations on 72,853 ﬁrms and the average observation length of a ﬁrm in the sample is 11.7 years.
The average number of ﬁrms per year is 32,850. The following Tables 20 and 21 as well as 22
and 23 show the average sectoral 47 and the size distributions in our sample, as well as the dis-
tributions over the number of observations and legal forms, respectively.
47WZ 2003 is the industry classiﬁcation from 2003 that the German national accounting system
(Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung, VGR) uses.
38Table 20: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION
ID Sector Observations Frequency WZ 2003
10 Agriculture 12,291 1.44% A, B
20 Energy & Mining 4,165 0.49% C, E
31 Chemical Industry, Oil 14,721 1.72% DF, DG
32 Plastics, Rubber 23,892 2.80% DH
33 Glass, Ceramics 28,623 3.35% DI
34 Metals 30,591 3.58% DJ
35 Machinery 162,407 19.01% DK, DL, DM, DN
36 Wood, Paper, Printing 61,672 7.22% DD, DE
37 Textiles, Leather 46,173 5.41% DB, DC
38 Food, Tobacco 37,708 4.41% DA
40 Construction 54,569 6.39% F
61 Wholesale Trade 213,071 24.95% G51
62 Retail Trade & Cars 142,137 16.64% G50, G51
70 Transportation & Communication 22,085 2.59% I
Total 854,105
Table 21: SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS OF FIRMS
Number of
Employees 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500+
Fraction 6.14% 9.46% 8.24% 7.30% 26.28% 17.04% 14.37% 5.68% 5.49%
Capital Stock
(in 1000 1991-Euro) 0-299 300-599 600-999 1,000-1,499 1,500-2,499 2,500-4,999 5,000-9,999 10,000-24,999 25,000+
Fraction 8.23% 9.01% 9.67% 9.36% 13.08% 17.71% 13.87% 11.08% 7.99%
Real Value Added
(in 1000 1991-Euro) 0-299 300-499 500-999 1,000-1,499 1,500-2,499 2,500-4,999 5,000-9,999 10,000-24,999 25,000+
Fraction 8.17% 7.93% 16.38% 11.56% 14.45% 16.28% 11.20% 8.25% 5.79%
39Table 22: OBSERVATION DISTRIBUTION
Obs. per Firm Firms Percent Cum. Obs. per Firm Firms Percent Cum.
5 8,973 12.32 12.32 16 2,487 3.41 78.10
6 7,592 10.42 22.74 17 2,225 3.05 81.16
7 6,609 9.07 31.81 18 2,024 2.78 83.93
8 5,724 7.86 39.67 19 1,849 2.54 86.47
9 4,901 6.73 46.39 20 1,619 2.22 88.69
10 4,338 5.95 52.35 21 1,479 2.03 90.72
11 3,960 5.44 57.78 22 1,351 1.85 92.58
12 3,528 4.84 62.63 23 1,446 1.98 94.56
13 3,134 4.30 66.93 24 988 1.36 95.92
14 3,006 4.13 71.05 25 892 1.22 97.14
15 2,647 3.63 74.69 26 2081 2.86 100
Total 72,853
Table 23: LEGAL FORM DISTRIBUTION
Legal Form Observations Frequency
Publicly Traded (AG, KGaA, etc.) 18,582 2.18%
Limited Liability Companies (GmbH, GmbH&Co., etc.) 506,184 59.26%
Fully Liable Partnerships (OHG, KG, etc.) 327,526 38.35%
Other: unincorporated associations (e.V.) 1,813 0.21%
municipal agencies (Körperschaften öR) etc.
Total 854,105 100%




less so the other canonical ratios, such as the investment rate, average labor productivity and
the labor share, which has obviously to do with our larger ﬁrm bias in the sample.48
Table 24: USTAN AND THE NFPBS
USTAN/NFPBS USTAN NFPBS NFPBS/Aggregate
Value Added 70% - - 59%
Investment 44% - - 39%
Capital 71% - - 26%
Employment 49% - - 65%
Payroll 54% - - 65%
Capital/Value Added - 1.544 1.496 -
Investment/Value Added - 0.099 0.158 -
Value Added/Employment - 52828 36859 -
Payroll/Value Added - 0.506 0.657 -
Figure 5 shows that except for a certain overrepresentation of manufacturing and a certain
underrepresentation of the transportation and communication sector, USTAN represents the
sectoral composition in NFPBS rather well.
Figure 6 demonstrates that also the cyclical behavior of USTAN and NFPBS is close. The
correlation of the cyclical components of value added is 0.7671 and for the investment rate it is
0.7843.49
48 To compute these time-average statistics we only average over the data from 1973 to 1990, because from then
on German national accounting does no longer report West and East Germany separately. For the business cy-
cle statistics we use the post-reuniﬁcation data, but ﬁlter separately before and after this structural break. NFPBS
value added is taken from Bruttowertschoepfung in jeweiligen Preisen, table 3.2.1 of VGR, deﬂated year-by-year by
the implicit deﬂator for aggregate value added, table 3.1.1 of VGR (we apply the same deﬂator to USTAN data).
The base year is always 1991. We experiment also with implicit sector-speciﬁc deﬂators for value added from
table 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of VGR, and results are robust to this. NFPBS investment is Bruttoanlageinvestitionen in jew-
eiligen Preisen from table 3.2.8.1, deﬂated with the implicit sector-speciﬁc investment price deﬂators given by
Bruttoanlageinvestitionen - preisbereinigt, a chain index, from table 3.2.9.1, VGR. NFPBS capital is Nettoanlagev-
ermoegen in Preisen von 2000 from table 3.2.19.1, VGR, re-chained to 1991 prices. In both the computation of
investment and capital data for USTAN in the PIM we use the implicit sector and capital good speciﬁc (equipment
and non-residential structures) deﬂators for investment: tables 3.2.8.2, 3.2.9.2., 3.2.8.3 and 3.2.9.3., VGR. We also
experiment with deﬂating USTAN data with a uniform investment price deﬂator, the Preisindex der Investitions-
gueterproduzenten, source: GP-X002, Statistisches Bundesamt. NFPBS employment is number of employed, Ar-
beitnehmer, from table 3.2.13, VGR. Finally, payroll is taken from Arbeitnehmerentgelt, table 3.2.10., VGR, deﬂated
by the same general implicit deﬂator for aggregate value added that we use to deﬂate value added numbers.
49Wetakeﬁrstdifferencesoflogvalueaddedandthentakeoutbothforitandtheinvestmentrateadeterministic
41Figure 5: Sectoral Composition in USTAN and NFPBS


































Graphs display the fraction of the sum of real value added, investment and capital, respectively, over all ﬁrms by
1-digit sector within the USTAN sample over the NFPBS aggregate.
Finally, how does the USTAN investment rate cross-section compare to known data from
the U.S.? The following Table 25 compares cross-sectional moments of the USTAN investment
rates, as well as for the manufacturing sector in USTAN (for reasons of comparison with only
ki,t inthedenominator)withtheonesreportedinCooperandHaltiwanger(2006)formanufac-
turing plant-level data. Even though USTAN is a ﬁrm-level as opposed to a plant-level data set,
these histograms are remarkably similar, which lends some optimism to the generalizability of
our results to the U.S.
Table 25: USTAN AND LRD MOMENTS
Moment USTAN USTAN-Manufacturing LRD
Negative Spike (<-20%) 0.3% 0.3% 1.8%
Negative Investment (-20%,-1%) 2.6% 2.0% 8.6%
Inaction (-1%,1%) 15.1% 11.4% 8.1%
Positive Investment (1%,20%) 67.7% 73.6% 62.9%
Positive Spike (> 20%) 14.2% 12.7% 18.6%
linear trend to remove the growth of the USTAN sample over time. The correlation between only the ﬁrst differ-
ences in log value added is still 0.5348, and 0.4966, when an HP(100)-ﬁlter is applied. The correlation for the raw
investment rate series is 0.7089.
42Figure 6: Cyclical Behavior in USTAN and NFPBS
























Upper panel: time series for the sum of real value added over all ﬁrms in the USTAN sample and NFPBS after
detrending with logarithmic ﬁrst differences and a deterministic linear trend.
Lower panel: time series for the sum of investment over all ﬁrms in the USTAN sample and NFPBS, divided by the
average of the beginning-of-period and end-of-period aggregate capital stocks in USTAN and NFPBS, respectively,
after detrending with a deterministic linear trend.
A.2 Capital Stocks
In order to obtain economically meaningful stocks of capital series for each ﬁrm, we have to
re-calculate capital stocks in a Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). The ﬁrst step is to compute
ﬁrm-level investment series, ii,t, from the corporate balance sheets, which contain data only
on accounting capital stocks, ka
i,t, and accounting total depreciation, da
i,t. The following accu-






The next step is to recognize that capital stocks from corporate balance sheets are not di-
rectly usable for economic analysis for two reasons: 1) accounting depreciation, da
i,t, in cor-
porate balance sheets is often motivated by tax reasons and typically higher than economic
depreciation, ±e
i,t, expressed as a rate; 2) accounting capital stocks are reported at historical
50Speciﬁcally, ka
i,t is the sum of balance sheet items ap65, Technische Anlagen und Maschinen, and ap66, Andere
Anlagen, Betriebs-und Geschaeftsausstattung, for equipment; and balance sheet item ap64, Grundstuecke, Bauten,
for structures. Since balance sheet data are typically end-of-year stock data, notice that ka
i,t is the end-of-period
capital stock in year t ¡1. da
i,t is proﬁt and loss account item ap156, Abschreibungen auf Sachanlagen und imma-
terielle Vermoegensgegenstaende des Anlagevermoegens. In contrast to ka
i,t, da
i,t is not given for each capital good
separately. For the solution of this complication, see below.




t (assuming that pI
t increases over time). We therefore apply a Perpetual Inventory





















i,1 is the accounting capital stock in prices of 1991 at the beginning of an uninterrupted
sequence of ﬁrm observations – if for a ﬁrm-year we have a missing investment observation,
the PIM is started anew, when the ﬁrm appears again in the data set. We estimate ±e
t for each
year from national accounting data, VGR, separately for equipment and non-residential struc-
tures(table3.1.3,VGR,NettoanlagevermoegennachVermoegensarteninjeweiligenPreisen,Aus-
ruestungen und Nichtwohnbauten; table 3.1.4, VGR, Abschreibungen nach Vermoegensarten in
jeweiligen Preisen, Ausruestungen und Nichtwohnbauten). VGR contains sectoral and capital
good speciﬁc depreciation data only after 1991, which is why we decided to use only capital
good speciﬁc depreciation rates for the entire time horizon. For the data sources for invest-
ment price deﬂators see footnote 48. The drawback of this procedure is that we do not observe
directly capital-good speciﬁc da
i,t in the balance sheets (differently from ka
i,t), so that (12) is not
directly applicable for the two types of capital goods separately. We therefore split up da
i,t ac-
cording to the fraction that each capital good accounts for in the book value of total capital,
weighting each capital good by its VGR depreciation rate. Creating a capital series for both cap-
ital goods this way is mainly meant to provide a better estimate for total capital for each ﬁrm,
because we ﬁnally aggregate up both types of capital into a single capital good at the ﬁrm-level.
There is a ﬁnal complication, which comes through relying on ka
i,1 as the starting value of
the PIM. It is typically not a good estimate of the productive real capital stock of the ﬁrm at that




i,t, and replace ka
i,1 by Áka
i,1 in the perpetual inventory method. We do this iteratively,


































i,t, Á(0) Æ1. We stop when for each sector and each capital good category ÁÇ1.1.
Since for our purposes we want to compute economic, i.e. productive, capital stocks, we
then – as a ﬁnal step – add to the capital stock series from this iterative PIM the net present
value of the real expenditures for renting and leasing equipment and structures.51
A.3 Labor Inputs
AmoreparticulardifﬁcultywithUSTANdataisthatinformationonthenumberofemployeesis
only updated infrequently for some companies, as it is not taken directly from balance sheets,
but sampled from supplementary company information. Being no balance sheet item, the em-
ployment data is not constrained by legal accounting rules and did not undergo consistency
checks by Bundesbank staff. However, in order to compute ﬁrm-level Solow residuals, we need
some measure of employment.
We base this measure on the payroll data (wagebilli,t) from the proﬁt and loss statements
(itemap154,Personalaufwand). Payrolldataisregulatedbyaccountingstandardsandischecked
for consistency by the Bundesbank using accounting identities. In contrast to the direct em-
ployment data, the payroll data is generally considered of high quality. Therefore, we exploit
this data to construct a proxy measure for (log) employment ni,t as follows (with a slight abuse
of notation, we use ni,t here for log employment).
The idea behind our proxy measure is that we can determine sectoral average wages even
though ﬁrm level employment is measured with error. Since wage bargaining in Germany is
highly centralized, the sectoral average wage is all we need then, since it is a good proxy for ﬁrm
level wages. Therefore, dividing ﬁrm level payroll by the sectoral average wage recovers true
ﬁrm level employment.




i,t Æni,t Å"i,t. (18)
Then we decompose the wage per employee, !i,t, of ﬁrm i at time t into two effects. One is
determined by a ﬁrm-time-speciﬁc wage component wi,t, and the other one being region-,
r (i,t), sector-, j (i,t), and size-class-speciﬁc, s(i,t), where j (i,t), r (i,t) and s(i,t) denote that
51 Speciﬁcally,wetakeitemap161,Miet-undPachtaufwendungen,fromtheproﬁtandlossaccounts,deﬂateitby
the implicit investment good price deﬂator, which we compute, in turn, from tables 3.2.8.1 and 3.2.9.1 from VGR,
and then divide it by a measure of the user cost of capital. The latter is simply the sum of real interest rates for a
given year, which - courtesy of the Bundesbank - we compute from nominal interest rates on corporate bonds and
ex-postCPIinﬂationdata(theseriesisavailablefromtheauthorsuponrequest),andthetime-average,accounting
capital-good weighted depreciation rate per ﬁrm.
52We use item ap34, Beschaeftigtenzahl im Durchschnitt des Geschaeftsjahres, to measure n¤
i,t, where available.
45ﬁrm i belongs to sector j, region r and size-class s at time t, respectively.53 Thus, we write
!i,t Æ ¯ wj(i,t),r(i,t),s(i,t),t Åwi,t. (19)





we can estimate a sector-region-size wage component, ¯ wj,r,s,t, as:54

















We then use this estimate of the average wage rate to estimate employment on the basis of the
ﬁrm’s wage bill:
ˆ nit Æ logwagebillit ¡c ¯ wj,r,s,t (21)



































The second equality stems from using (18). The next to last equality holds, because one can
replace !it by (19), realizing that the ¯ w, which do not depend on a speciﬁc ﬁrm, cancel. The
last equality holds, because, by construction, the average ﬁrm-level deviation from a sector-










is negligible. In addition, since wage bargaining is highly centralized
in Germany, also the ﬁrm speciﬁc wage component, wit, can be expected to be of lesser impor-
tance, i.e. the variance ¾2
w is small. In particular it can be expected to be smaller than the initial
measurement error in employment stocks. Therefore our measure of employment, ˆ ni,t, should
follow real employment, ni,t, more closely than n¤
i,t.
To corroborate this claim, we checked our procedure using data from the German social
53Speciﬁcally, for sectors we use the 2-digit classiﬁcation in Table 20 in Appendix A.1. For size classes we use
terciles of the capital distribution in each year. For the region-speciﬁc wage component we proceed as follows: we
divideWestGermany into three regions, accordingtozipcodes: Southwithzipcodes startingwith7,8,9, exceptfor
98 and 99; Middle with zip codes starting with 4,5,6, except for 48 and 59; North with zip codes starting with 2,3 as
well as 48 and 59. However, not all balance sheets feature zip code information, which is why we compute c ¯ wj,r,s,t
with and without a region component. For those ﬁrms that do not have zip code information or for those ﬁrms
that are in sector-region-size bins with fewer than 50 observations in a given year, we take the estimate without the
region component.
54To estimate c ¯ wj,r,s,t we of course use only those observations, where n¤
i,t, i.e. item ap34, Beschaeftigtenzahl im
Durchschnitt des Geschaeftsjahres, is available.
46security records at the Institut fuer Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), which provide in-
formation on the wage bill and employment at the establishment level. There we observe true
employment and wage bills for all plants and the time 1975-2006. Constraining ourselves to the
sampleperiod1975-1998andtoplantswithmorethan12employees,i.e. todatacomparableto




variance of employment changes (¾2
¢n Æ0.0163, ¾2
¢ˆ n Æ0.0162). Finally, a correlation coefﬁcient
between mean(¢ni,t) in the USTAN data and the log-change in aggregate NFPBS employment
of 0.653 shows also the quality of our employment measure.
A.4 Solow Residual Calculation
With the estimated ﬁrm-level capital stocks and employment levels we can now compute ﬁrm-
level Solow residuals from the logged production function (1). In our baseline speciﬁcation we
estimate the factor elasticities, º and µ, as 1-digit sector-speciﬁc median, pooled over all ﬁrm-
year observations in a sector, expenditure shares.55 Table 26 displays the estimated elasticities.
Simulations show that under the null hypothesis of the model the labor elasticity is very accu-
ratelyestimatedbythelaborshare,whereasthecapitalelasticityisslightlyoverestimatedbythe
capital share, which makes our simulations conservative, as we have shown that a lower capital
elasticity, i.e. more curvature in the revenue function, will lead to a stronger extensive margin
effect, that will make investment dispersion more procyclical (see Section 5.1 for details). No-
tice that for the aggregate Solow residual calculation in the baseline scenario, for which we use
thedatasourcesspeciﬁedinFootnote48inAppendixA.1,wesimplyusetheexpenditureshares
frommanufacturing, asmanufacturingisstillthelargestsectorwithinNFPBS(hadweusedany
weighted median of expenditure shares the result would have been the same). We experiment
also with weighted average expenditure shares, both weighted with value added and with em-
ployment/capital and using USTAN and NFPBS weights. To come up with a single number
for each factor elasticity, we simply take the median of these four weighted averages and use
ºÆ0.5229andµ Æ0.2352. Thisrequiresarecalibrationoftheadjustmentcostsfactor, ¯ », to0.35,
but the baseline result is not changed: the resulting procyclicality of investment dispersion is
0.584, a number very close to the 0.580 of the baseline scenario.
55Weuseproﬁtandlossaccountitemap153,Rohergebnis,forﬁrm-levelvalueaddedanddeﬂateitinthebaseline
scenario with the aggregate value added deﬂator, but experiment also with sector-speciﬁc value added deﬂators,
see Footnote 48 in Appendix A.1 for details. To compute ﬁrm-level expenditure shares, we proceed as follows:
the labor share is simply total payroll divided by value added (ap154/ap153); capital expenditures, which are then
again divided by value added, are the sum of the PIM capital stock and the net present value of renting and leasing
expenditures multiplied by the user cost of capital as speciﬁed in Footnote 51 in Appendix A.2.
47Table 26: SECTOR-SPECIFIC EXPENDITURE SHARES
ID Sector labor share º capital share µ
1 Agriculture 0.2182 0.7310
2 Energy & Mining 0.3557 0.5491
3 Manufacturing 0.5565 0.2075
4 Construction 0.6552 0.1771
6 Trade 0.4536 0.2204
7 Transport & Communication 0.4205 0.2896
A.5 Two More Graphs
Figure 7: Data: Time Series of Investment Dispersion and Cyclical Component of GDP - Nor-
malized by their STD
















Dispersion refers to the cross sectional standard-deviation. The cyclical component of GDP is the HP-ﬁltered
output series with a smoothing parameter of 100.
48Figure 8: Baseline Model: Time Series of Investment Dispersion and Cyclical Component of
GDP - Normalized by their STD

















Dispersion refers to the cross sectional standard-deviation. The cyclical component of GDP is the HP-ﬁltered
output series with a smoothing parameter of 100.
49A.6 Cross-sectional Dispersion Data
Table 27: CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION DATA FOR THE INVESTMENT RATE AND THE EMPLOY-
































Notes: ¾: cross-sectional standard deviation of the within-transformed data. No detrending. The corresponding
data for ¾(¢log²i,t) and ¾(¢logyi,t) can be found in Bachmann and Bayer (2009).
50B Robustness of Cross-sectional Cyclicality
In this appendix we check the robustness of the main empirical ﬁnding of this paper – the pro-
cyclicality of investment dispersion – to sample selection and variable construction. First, we
use an aggregate price deﬂator for investment goods (see Footnote 48 in Appendix A.1 for de-




ing 5 and 10 standard deviations instead of 3.56 Fourth, we employ a speciﬁcation, where we
assume that an outlier above 3 standard deviations means a merger and, subsequently, treat
these ﬁrms as new ﬁrms in addition to removing them in the year, where the outlier occurs.
Fifth, we restrict the sample to ﬁrms with at least 20 observations in ﬁrst differences, in order
to make sure that the cyclical effects we ﬁnd are not due to cyclical variations in the sample
composition.57 Sixth, we use all the ﬁrms that we observe at least twice with ﬁrst differences.58
Finally, we carry out a more standard PIM that simply uses the reported capital stocks in the
ﬁrst year of observation for a ﬁrm, instead of solving a ﬁxed point problem in correction factors
(seeAppendixA.2fordetails). AsonecanseefromTable28, theresultsarerobusttoalltheseal-
ternative sampling procedures; in particular, the robust procyclicality of investment dispersion
is not driven by a change in the cyclicality of the dispersion of the driving force.
56The latter variant lowers the number of dropped ﬁrm-year observations due to outliers in factor and value
added changes from 41,453 to 4,240, and the ones due to outliers in Solow residual changes from 18,978 to 1,486.
This leaves the total number of ﬁrm-year observations at 934,315 and the total number of ﬁrms in the sample at
78,092.
57Consistent with the slightly lower correlation of investment dispersion with aggregate output in this case, we
ﬁnd the same correlation coefﬁcient to be 0.382, when we control for sample selection in the following way: we
estimate a simple selection model, where lagged ﬁrm-level Solow residuals determine selection and the ﬁrm-level
investment rate is modeled as a mean regression. We use the maximum likelihood estimator by Heckman (1976)
to infer the selection-corrected variance of the residual in the ﬁrm-level investment rate equation. The latter is
very close to the sample variance of ﬁrm-level investment rates, indicating that our results are not inﬂuenced by
systematic sample drop-outs.
58This lowers the number of dropped ﬁrm-year observations due to not satisfying the minimum observation
requirement from 417,550 to 158,950. This leaves the total number of ﬁrm-year observations at 971,308 and the
total number of ﬁrms in the sample at 114,528.
51Table 28: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT DISPERSION - DATA TREATMENT
Treatment ½(¾(
ii,t
0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)),HP(100)¡Y ) ½(¾(¢log²i,t),HP(100)¡Y )
Baseline 0.451 -0.481
Uniform price index for I-goods 0.427 -0.480
Stricter outlier removal 0.452 -0.499
Looser outlier removal 0.422 -0.476
Very loose outlier removal 0.427 -0.578
Stricter Merger Criterion 0.416 -0.486
Longer in sample 0.392 -0.341
Shorter in sample 0.439 -0.485
Standard Perpetual Inventory 0.563 -0.492
C Aggregate Statistics
Table 29: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE BASELINE CALIBRATION
Moment/Aggregate Quantity Y C I N
Standard Deviation 4.04% (2.30%) 1.27% (1.79%) 18.99% (4.37%) 3.01% (1.80%)
Relative Standard Deviation 1 0.32 (0.78) 4.71 (1.90) 0.74 (0.78)
Persistence 0.42 (0.48) 0.66 (0.67) 0.34 (0.42) 0.33 (0.61)
Correlation with Y 1 0.84 (0.66) 0.98 (0.83) 0.97 (0.68)
Notes:
Business cycle statistics of aggregate output, Y , consumptionC, investment I and employment N. N in the model
includes the amount of labor used to adjust the ﬁrms’ capital stocks. All variables are logged and then HP-ﬁltered
with a smoothing parameter of 100. The ﬁrst numbers in a column refer to a simulation of the model over T Æ
1500 periods. Numbers in brackets refer to German aggregate NFPBS data. Persistence refers to the ﬁrst order
autocorrelation.
All variables are logged and then HP-ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 100. The num-
bers in brackets are the statistics from the data, from the sectoral aggregate that corresponds
to the USTAN data: the non-ﬁnancial private business sector (NFPBS). They are gathered from
German sectoral national accounting data (see Footnote 48 in Appendix A.1 for details). Real
private consumption data are private Konsumausgaben, a chain index with base year in 1991,
from table 3.2 in the VGR. The model employment variable includes the amount of labor used
to adjust the ﬁrms’ capital stocks.
In our baseline calibration, the economy is overall too volatile, which we attribute partly to
52the fact that we compute the aggregate Solow residual process from the private non-ﬁnancial
business sector and not from the overall economy. Nevertheless, both the too high volatility
numbers, as well as the too low persistence numbers as well as the discrepancy between model
and the data in the relative standard deviations – relative to std(Y ) – of aggregate consumption





ter already at a level, where they would be near-neutral for aggregate dynamics, we do not view
this as a problem for our main result. More smoothing could be implemented through a stan-
dard quadratic adjustment cost element on top of the ﬁxed cost, however at both a substantial
computational burden and at the expense of cleanness of exposition. In fact, quadratic adjust-
ment costs would work very similarly to an increase in curvature in the maximized-out revenue
function, which, as we have shown, puts more emphasis on the procyclical extensive margin
and would only strengthen our mechanism. Our robustness checks include a case, where we
decrease the volatility of the aggregate Solow residual in order to match the volatility of aggre-
gate output. This puts relatively more weight on the second-moment shocks, i.e. the counter-
cyclicality of the dispersion in the Solow residual innovations, and would make it – all things
equal – harder for the extensive margin effect in the lumpy model to generate procyclicality of
investment dispersion. Row ﬁve in Table 17 in Section 5.2 shows that this does not invalidate
our baseline result. To summarize: the aggregate shortcomings of the model are similar to the
one in the standard RBC model, but based on our robustness checks we view them as mainly
orthogonal to the cross-sectional dynamics that this paper focusses on.
53D Sectoral Calibration
Table 30: SECTORAL CALIBRATION




0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)) µ º ±
Aggregate 0.3 12.01 2.1920 20.0355 0.208 0.557 0.108
MIN 0.5 11.56 1.3355 15.8334 0.549 0.356 0.093
MAN 0.25 11.47 2.2511 21.4518 0.208 0.557 0.119
CON 0.25 10.56 1.7684 20.9611 0.177 0.655 0.153
TRD 0.4 12.44 2.1091 17.6077 0.220 0.454 0.123
TRA 0.07 13.56 1.3315 10.6363 0.290 0.421 0.112
Notes: See Figure 2 for the sectoral acronyms. ¯ » is the calibrated adjustment cost parameter. ¯ ¾(²) is the long-run
standard deviation of the innovations to the ﬁrm-level Solow residual. µ and º are the capital and employment,
respectively, elasticity in the production function. In the computation for the mining and energy sector we scaled
down the measured and reported factor elasticities by a factor of 0.9. ± are sector-speciﬁc depreciation rates.
Table 31: RESULTS FROM SECTORAL CALIBRATION - AGGREGATE SOLOW RESIDUALS
Sector ½(¾(
ii,t
0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)),HP(100)¡Y ) ½(Fraction of Adjusters,HP(100)¡Y )
Model Data Model Data
Aggregate 0.580 0.451 0.485 0.727
MIN -0.097 0.011 -0.066 0.106
MAN 0.614 0.372 0.577 0.786
CON 0.335 0.357 0.154 0.675
TRD 0.900 0.452 0.917 0.575
TRA 0.239 0.473 0.255 0.592
Notes: See notes to Tables 12. See Figure 2 for the sectoral acronyms. Aggregate Solow residuals were used in the
driving force. HP(100)¡Y refers to the cyclical component of the output of the private non-ﬁnancial business
sector aggregate. The correlation coefﬁcients between model simulations and data are 0.721 for investment rate
dispersion and 0.560 for the extensive margin. The corresponding rank correlations are 0.4 and 0.3, respectively.
54Table 32: RESULTS FROM THE SECTORAL CALIBRATION - OWN SECTOR SOLOW RESIDUALS - COR-





0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1))) ½(Fraction of Adjusters,mean(
ii,t
0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)))
Model Data Model Data
Aggregate 0.621 0.792 0.736 0.847
MIN -0.259 -0.674 -0.164 -0.312
MAN 0.799 0.845 0.800 0.874
CON 0.781 0.713 0.682 0.884
TRD 0.984 0.720 0.989 0.869
TRA 0.302 0.622 0.342 0.822
Notes: See notes to Tables 12. See Figure 2 for the sectoral acronyms. Own sector Solow residuals were used in the
driving force. In the ﬁrst row, mean(
ii,t
0.5¤(ki,tÅki,tÅ1)) refers to the linearly detrended average investment rate in the
USTAN sample. From the second row onwards it means the linearly detrended average investment rate in the cor-
responding sector. The correlation coefﬁcients between model simulations and data are 0.899 for investment rate
dispersion and 0.972 for the extensive margin. The corresponding rank correlations are 0.9 and 0.6, respectively.
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